AN 4

ANGOLA: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT UNITA?

NEWARK PUBLIC LIBRARY

AUG 13 1986

U. S. GOVT. PUBS.
DEPOSITORY 376

HEARING

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 13, 1986

Printed for the use of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

61-063 O WASHINGTON : 1986

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402

Y 4. IN 8/18:

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(Established by H. Res. 658, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.)

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, *Chairman*

LOUIS STOKES, Ohio
DAVE McCURDY, Oklahoma
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Wisconsin
DAN DANIEL, Virginia
ROBERT A. ROE, New Jersey
GEORGE E. BROWN, Jr., California
MATTHEW F. McHUGH, New York
BERNARD J. DWYER, New Jersey

BOB STUMP, Arizona
ANDY IRELAND, Florida
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DICK CHENEY, Wyoming
BOB LIVINGSTON, Louisiana
BOB McEWEN, Ohio

JIM WRIGHT, Texas, *Ex Officio Member*
ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois, *Ex Officio Member*

THOMAS K. LATIMER, *Staff Director*
MICHAEL J. O'NEIL, *Chief Counsel*
STEVEN K. BERRY, *Associate Counsel*
JEANNE M. McNALLY, *Clerk*

CONTENTS

	Page
Hearing held on Thursday, March 13, 1986	1

LIST OF WITNESSES

Testimony of Dr. Richard E. Bissell, editor, Washington Quarterly	2
Testimony of Hon. Richard M. Moose, managing director, Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs	7
Testimony of Prof. Robert Rotberg, Massachusetts Institute of Technology	15
Testimony of Dimitri K. Simes, the Carnegie Endowment Institute for International Peace	17
H.R. 4276	57

READEX MICROPRINT best copy available

CONTENTS

HEARING ON ANGOLA

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room H-405, the Capitol, the Honorable Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Hamilton (presiding), Stokes, McCurdy, Beilenson, Kastenmeier, Daniel, Roe, Brown, McHugh, Dwyer, Stump, Ireland, Hyde, Cheney, Livingston, and McEwen.

Staff present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; Michael J. O'Neil, chief counsel; Steven K. Berry, associate counsel; Jeanne M. McNally, clerk; Bernard R. Toon, Jack Keliher, Martin C. Faga, Duane P. Andrews, Robert J. Surrette, Richard H. Giza, Diane S. Dornan, professional staff members; Bernard Raimo, Jr., counsel; and David S. Addington, counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This afternoon the committee meets to receive testimony on H.R. 4276, a bill which would make it the policy of the United States that if there is to be any United States involvement in military or paramilitary operations in Angola, it should be the result of a public Presidential request and public debate and a vote on this request by the Congress.

We sought the advice of a panel of distinguished experts, and they are, in alphabetical order, Dr. Richard E. Bissell, editor, Washington Quarterly; Mr. Richard M. Moose, Shearson Lehman Bros., New York, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; Prof. Robert Rotberg, professor of political science and history at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Mr. Dimitri K. Simes of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

We posed to each of these gentlemen two questions. First, if the United States decides to provide assistance to UNITA, should it do so openly or covertly; and second, what should United States policy toward Angola be, particularly with respect to UNITA?

In order to encourage the best exchange of views, I will ask the witnesses to deliver their statements or summaries of them before we begin our questions. The members will then be able to ask any or all of the witnesses to answer their particular questions.

We understand you have written statements. If you do, they will be entered into the record in full, and I would appreciate it very much if you would summarize your statements in a fairly brief period of time.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. STUMP. I would like to join in welcoming those who are appearing as witnesses before this committee today on H.R. 4276.

We do not have public hearings often in this committee and I think it is rather unusual that we are having one on a major foreign policy issue. Some of us believe public hearings of this kind belong in the Foreign Affairs Committee and not in the Intelligence Committee.

I would like to make clear at the outset my strong opposition to H.R. 4276. As a general matter, we should not by statute eliminate the option of the President of the United States, any President of the United States, to initiate a covert action when it is necessary in regard to foreign countries. Laws are already on the books to ensure that the Congress can exercise its proper role in oversight of a covert action, and should it ever become necessary, Congress can terminate a covert action program by governing the purse strings.

Just 8 months ago, the Congress repealed the decade-old Clark amendment that prohibited covert aid to groups in Angola. The bill before us in H.R. 4276 is just the Clark amendment all over again, and it would be a grave mistake, in my opinion, for the Congress to enact it into law.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Stump.

I know the bells have just rung for a vote, and I think before we begin the testimony, we will break so that we may have an opportunity to vote.

The committee stands in recess and we will return very shortly.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Bissell, you may begin.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD E. BISSELL, EDITOR, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

Mr. BISSELL. Mr. Chairman, let me apologize for not having any written statement for the committee. I just arrived last night from southern Africa, and as a result, haven't had time to write a statement. I can provide it later, if it would be of use to the committee.

I did have a chance this morning to write up some notes which I would like to present by way of introduction to the subject.

When I got off the plane last night, Mr. Chairman, and determined the frame of reference for this hearing, I can only say I was astonished. It is the kind of debate that could only occur in Washington: that Africans, white or black, left or right, find is unbelievable and far removed from the realities in the region. It has the potential for damaging U.S. foreign policy, whatever that policy may be, for years to come.

For those reasons and others, I should say at the beginning that I am opposed to H.R. 4276 not only because I support immediate U.S. aid to UNITA, but because I am also certain its passage would set back the United States search for peace and progress in the region for some years to come.

In these brief comments, let me focus on just two issues; they are mood and mechanisms.

The African mood on both sides of the color barrier is one of sober realism in their foreign policies. After 25 years of independence, the ascendance of power politics in relations between countries in southern Africa is a fact of life. Virtually all states have made their adjustments to that state of affairs. The overwhelming reality of military preponderance in the hands of South Africa and Cuba reverberates throughout the region.

One of Africa's most respected commentators, Prof. Ali Mazrui, recently noted two long-term trends emerging as determinative of the future. One was privatization; the other was militarization.

The United States and most African States regret that emergence of military force as an arbiter of political life, but I found on this trip African senior officials moving their countries to accommodate that reality. Out of that mood arises a certain skepticism toward United States foreign policy, especially in the Washington policy turmoil of the last 15 months over South Africa and Angola.

In several countries, in fact, high officials refer to the "American disease," in quotes, by which they meant inconsistency of policy, apparently arbitrary reversal of policies, as in the 1975–76 debate over Angola, and that a lack of accountability by United States policymakers damages African issues without a long-term commitment to seeing the way clear to solutions.

In fact, there was less concern over aid to UNITA per se than there was a foreboding that the United States might simply muddy the waters for some months and then withdraw, perhaps through congressional resolutions, leaving the Africans to clean up the mess.

Every foreign ministry I spoke with took administration statements on assistance to UNITA at face value, believed that aid was already flowing to UNITA, and regarded the possibility of a measure along the lines of H.R. 4276 as one more major case of American inability to stay the course.

To me, the mood of realism in southern Africa is an invaluable foundation for serious, complex talks over Angola, Namibia and other regional questions, and not to be wasted by congressional-executive bickering.

The other element I want to discuss briefly is that of mechanisms, in this case toward achieving peace in Angola. African governments above all do not want foreign assistance to simply prolong the civil war in Angola.

The front line states of southern Africa, grouped together in SADCC, are suffering badly from this civil war. The indefinite closure of the Angolan railroad, the lack of national integration, distracts from settling the Namibian issue and provides the justification for South African and Cuban militarization of the region. They want somebody to take the initiative in moving the countries toward a diplomatic settlement.

Let's be candid, as much as one can in an open hearing, about the nature of African diplomacy. It is two-tracked in nature. At the rhetorical level the African countries are committed to independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of policy. One hears this from the Organization of African Unity as well as from the individual countries of the region.

These relatively free countries in Africa cannot publicly legitimize civil war itself in Angola since disorder plagues most African countries to one degree or another; but Africans also operate at a pragmatic level and any private discussion reflects their actual role in the power struggle: the long-term struggle about South African power, whether white or black rule, concern about a repeat of the Cuban role in destabilization of Zaire in the late 1970's if UNITA did not preoccupy them, and a hope that American support of UNITA will not result in an East-West competition in their region.

American assistance, if overt, becomes more threatening in that context than a well-managed covert program. It maintains the rhetorical commitment that sustains long-term hopes of Africans that they will one day be independent members of the international community, and provides an opportunity to move the Angolan civil war in a concrete sense toward a negotiated conclusion.

I regret to say that H.R. 4276 would send a message to African States that rhetorical U.S. policy is designed to be antagonistic to their interests and to provoke a superpower competition, and it would inevitably mean a breakdown of whatever negotiations are underway on issues of mutual concern and, above all, it would indicate that the United States does not understand the handicaps of African countries in constructing viable foreign policies.

In Africa, the United States is a very big elephant in a very small pond, and if it is possible, it has to move carefully but deliberately rather than to stand on the shore and trumpet.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Bissell.

I appreciate very much the fact that you testify right after your trip from Africa.

[The biography of Mr. Bissell follows:]

RICHARD E. BISSELL

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES: Executive Editor (1984-).

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY: Adjunct Professor of Government (1984-).

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY: Director of Research (1983-1984). Directed staff of 75 and $8 million budget with mandate to assess foreign public opinion in all foreign regions. Director of Program Coordination and Development (1982-1983), with a staff of 80 responsible for all overseas speakers' and arts programs for USIA.

JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES: Professorial lecturer (1982). Taught course in strategic economics.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA: Visiting Professor of Political Science (1978-1982). Taught courses in African international relations, American foreign policy, and international law and organizations.

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE: Research Associate (1974-1982), Managing Editor of ORBIS, a journal of world affairs (1976-1981), and Director of Economic Security Studies (1981-1982).

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY: Taught courses in Master of Public Administration Program (1974-1978).

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Studies (1974-1976).

EDUCATION:

Tufts University	PhD	International Relations	1973
The Fletcher School	MALD		1970
of Law and Diplomacy	MA		1969
Stanford University	BA	History	1968

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

Council on Foreign Relations, New York: Elected to membership, 1978.

World Affairs Council of Philadelphia: Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors (1978-1982).

Editorial Board member of the Journal of Contemporary African Studies and the International Security Review.

RICHARD E. BISSELL

Consultant to the Department of Defense, National Strategy Information Center, National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, American Security Council, Global Interdependence Center, Department of State, Heritage Foundation, and others.

Papers presented at many conferences, such as the American Political Science Association, African Studies Association, as well as at professional meetings abroad, as in the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Korea, and China.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moose.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD M. MOOSE, SHEARSON LEHMAN BROS., NEW YORK, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. MOOSE. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I will summarize my statement. I believe the committee has the full text before it.

[The statement of Mr. Moose follows:]

TESTIMONY OF
RICHARD M. MOOSE
BEFORE THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MARCH 13, 1986

ANGOLA: H.R. 4276

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

There are two reasons why the Committee should approve H.R. 4276. The first is that U.S. intervention in the Angolan civil war is a matter of sufficient seriousness to warrant formal action by the Congress. The second reason for approving the bill is that intervention in this particular civil war would be bad policy. If the Congress is given an opportunity to examine this question, I cannot believe that it will approve.

A heavy burden rests upon those who argue that the Congress should not be given an opportunity to vote on sending aid to Mr. Savimbi. The Administration's intention to do so has been declared publicly by the President and the Secretary of State. The Assistant Secretary of State for Africa has testified publicly before a committee of the other body that the program to provide arms to Mr. Savimbi has been set in motion. Thus, this action can, by no stretch of the imagination, be considered "covert" or a "significant anticipated intelligence activity" within the meaning of the relevant statute.

A great deal of bad policy has been made in secret. Bad policy has also been made in public, of course, but faulty judgments, like certain bacteria, flourish in the dark. When proposals of this nature are decided behind closed doors, valid points of view are often underrepresented, dubious considerations accorded undue weight, and fundamental defects rationalized away. That is what happened in 1975 when Secretary of State Kissinger, flying in the face of

realities on the ground, set out to "demonstrate American resolve." Now ten years later, with equal disregard for broad U.S. interests in the region, other Americans wish for the U.S. to intervene in the Angolan civil war in order to make an ideological statement. If that is their desire, let them put the matter to a vote. If our purpose is to get the Cubans out of Angola — and I have always supported that as a policy goal — there are more effective and less costly ways of accomplishing that end.

One can take the view that the procedural issue raised by this bill is of secondary importance; that the real issue is the underlying substantive one. While I consider the procedural question to be a highly significant one, I am happy to address the policy substance. In doing so, I would note that there is very little agreement as to what is the real substantive issue. I would like to suggest to the committee some questions which should be raised concerning the substance of the Angola issue.

Is the question before you what to do about Communists in general? Or about the Cubans in Angola? I believe the basic question to be addressed is how best to secure the peace, freedom, and stability of southern Africa. Within that context we should ask who threatens this goal.

How does Namibia fit into this picture? Should we first see the Cubans out of Angola, or the South Africans out of Namibia? Maybe we should get rid of both the South Africans and the Cubans. That's my choice. But will sending aid to Mr. Savimbi contribute to these goals? In my view, it will

not. Sending arms will enlarge the conflict, will perpetuate or increase the Cuban combat presence and will entangle us more than ever in South Africa's collapsing position in southern Africa.

It is not useful to debate whether the South Africans or the Communists are more dangerous to U.S. interests in southern Africa. Both can be dealt with in a policy framework which takes account of the relationship between the two.

The key element of such a policy framework is recognition that South Africa is the primary source of the region's instability and that the Communists are the main beneficiaries of that instability. By acting to end Pretoria's interference with its neighbors, we can effectively undercut the Soviet Union and realize the full potential of our own influence.

It is no secret that the South Africans hope to see us involved in Angola. They like to portray themselves as the bulwark of resistance to communism in Southern Africa. In fact, the Afrikaaner apartheid regime is a priceless policy asset of the Soviet Union -- and it does not cost them anything. To the extent we equivocate in our opposition to apartheid, and to the extent that we are perceived to be aligned with Pretoria, we will lose and the Communists will gain.

The Congress should also consider some practical aspects of this matter, for example: how will we deliver supplies to Mr. Savimbi? If we send them

through Zaire we run the very real risk of rekindling the Zaire-Angola border war. Members may recall that it was only with great difficulty that we stopped those hostilities in 1978. If that prospect is unattractive, would we consider using Zambia as a supply route? Perhaps we plan to send our supplies through South Africa. This does not appear to be the Administration's present plan, which means that the Administration recognizes the danger of its association with South Africa in this dubious enterprise.

The costs and implications of giving arms to Mr. Savimbi would vary enormously depending upon our goals. If we intervene, do we intend to commit ourselves to a military solution? We should examine closely what this would entail. Among other things, we might soon find ourselves obliged to take over the full South African support role. This presently includes ground combat units and air cover. Who will perform these functions? I suppose we could hire the Zairians. If we are not out to "win," then we must try to define some logical limit to our involvement. Do we give just enough supplies to Mr. Savimbi to enable him to "bleed" the Russians as some have proposed? Or is the purpose of our aid merely to enhance Mr. Savimbi's bargaining power? Does Mr. Savimbi agree? The proponents of aid to Mr. Savimbi are far from agreement as to the object of their intervention.

No serious examination of the wisdom of providing arms to Mr. Savimbi can fail to take account of recent history. What happened when we intervened ten years ago? What were the levels of Cuban troops before we and the South

Africans intervened, and what were they afterward? Why do Cuban troop levels fluctuate in parallel with South African operations in Angola? The answers to these questions suggest that the key to getting the Cubans out of Angola lies in getting the South Africans out of Angola and out of Namibia. Finally, how would intervention affect our role as "honest brokers" of a negotiation to get the Cubans out of Angola?

Regardless which of these questions one considers most important -- in fact they are all important -- they should be debated publicly. You can be virtually certain that these issues have not been examined in these terms at the highest level of the Executive Branch. If the Congress does not examine them, who will? That is why this Committee should pass the legislation before it today.

Thank you.

There are two reasons why I believe the committee should approve H.R. 4276. The first is that United States intervention in the Angolan civil war is a matter of such seriousness to warrant formal action by the Congress.

The second reason for approving the bill is that intervention in this particular civil war would be bad policy. I believe Congress should have the opportunity to examine these questions in detail.

With regard to the procedural question, given the fact that the administration's intention to intervene has been publicly declared by all of the high officials of the executive branch, including the President, and that the Assistant Secretary of State has testified that an arms program has been set in motion, these actions can by no stretch of the imagination be considered covert or significant anticipated intelligence activities within the meaning of the relevant statute.

Indeed from this point forward continued reliance on the authority under which the actions are now being carried out constitutes a misuse of that authority which may well impair the President's ability to conduct covert actions in the future.

I support very strongly the President's need for such authority, but I fear that the misuse or the abuse of it in this case would have a very harmful effect.

Turning to the substantive side of the issue, and recalling the two questions which the chairman has put before us, if our purpose is to get the Cubans out of Angola—a policy goal I have always supported—I believe there are more effective and less costly ways of accomplishing that end than by intervening on behalf of Mr. Savimbi and UNITA.

In this connection there are a number of substantive questions which should be examined by the Congress. The first question to be addressed, before one turns to the question of what should be done, is how best can the United States secure the peace, freedom, and stability of southern Africa? Within that context, we might ask ourselves who threatens this goal.

First, it is important to look at the region as a whole and to look at U.S. interests in the region as a whole. There is a very important interrelation to be established there.

South Africa illegally occupies Namibia. It has been opposed in this by a movement which is known as SWAPO. In order to combat SWAPO and maintain their illegal hold on Namibia, the South Africans have invaded Angola. Their forces have been there for some number of years, off and on, in greater or lesser degree, but pretty much continuously since 1981.

The Angolans were unable to get any meaningful assistance from the rest of the world to secure their territorial integrity against the depredations of the South Africans. When the international community did not respond, the Angolans turned to the Cubans who sent combat forces to help them.

So, should we first see the Cubans out of Angola or should we first see the South Africans out of Namibia? Perhaps we should get rid of both the South Africans and the Cubans. That is my choice, but will sending aid to Mr. Savimbi contribute to that goal? In my view, it will not. Sending arms will enlarge the conflict, will perpetuate or increase the Cuban combat presence, and will entangle

61-063 O - 86 - 2

us more than ever in South Africa's collapsing position in southern Africa.

There is no secret the South Africans would like to see us involved in Angola. Apartheid is a priceless policy windfall to the Soviet Union. They would love to see us arrayed on the South African side as we would be if we pursue this policy.

Building our policy of seeking stability in southern Africa by working with the South Africans is a very harmful concept but I don't believe it is useful to debate whether the South Africans or the Communists are the more dangerous to United States interests in South Africa. I think both are dangerous, but both can be dealt with in a policy framework which takes account of the relationship between the two.

A key element of such a policy framework is the recognition that South Africa is a primary source of the region's instability and that the Communists are the main beneficiaries of that instability. By acting to end Pretoria's interference with its neighbors, we can effectively undercut the Soviet Union and realize the full potential of our own considerable influence there.

There are several practical aspects of this matter that the committee and the Congress should examine. For example, how will we send supplies to Mr. Savimbi? If we send them through Zaire, again we run the very real risk of rekindling the Zaire-Angola border war. That is an historical subject that is of great relevance to the consideration here.

If that prospect is unattractive, would we rather use Zambia? They have been used before as a conduit of supplies to Mr. Savimbi. Perhaps we intend to send our supplies through South Africa, although the administration doesn't have very much enthusiasm about that.

In short, intervention will infect the region, restarting some of these conflicts that have been buried now for some time.

There is a very troublesome corner of Africa that people don't think about very much; the place where Zaire, Angola, and Zambia come together. The part of Zaire that adjoins is the Shaba Province. There have been disputes here, from the very beginning of Zaire's history as an independent country down to the latest wars fought in 1978. We have long had great concern about this area. Sending supplies to Mr. Savimbi, risks reopening the whole question of the borders there.

The cost of giving aid to Mr. Savimbi would vary very greatly depending on our goals. Do we want to see a military solution? What would we be obliged to do should we find ourselves taking over the full South African role with Savimbi, which now includes ground combat units and air cover?

If we don't provide ground forces and air cover, who is going to perform these functions? We might get the Zairians to do it. They have done it before. We encouraged them to go into Angola in 1975. They didn't do a very good job at all, and they got out.

Perhaps we only send enough supplies to, as some put it, "bleed the Russians." I fear the Angolans will probably bleed more than the Russians.

Or, is the purpose of our aid, as Dr. Bissell suggests, to enhance Mr. Savimbi's bargaining power? Does Mr. Savimbi agree with that

limited objective? The proponents of aid to Mr. Savimbi, in short, are far from agreement about the objective of their intervention.

No serious examination of this question should ignore recent history. I have referred to it. What happened when we intervened 10 years ago? What were the levels of Cuban troops before our intervention began, and what were they afterward?

Why do Cuban troop levels fluctuate in parallel with South African operations in Angola? The answers to these questions suggest that the key to getting the Cubans out of Angola lies in getting the South Africans out of Angola and Namibia.

Finally, I do believe that intervention would severely undercut our role as the honest broker in a negotiation to get the Cubans out of Angola. Regardless of which of these questions one considers most important, I think they are all important. They all need to be debated.

I obviously disagree profoundly with Dr. Bissell's characterization of African attitudes. I have probably spent more time in Africa since I left the Department of State than I spent when I was there before, and while I talk to Central Bank governors and finance ministers, I do still see people in the foreign affairs area and at the highest levels of government. Thus I do, with all respect, believe that African attitudes are otherwise. Perhaps we talk to different Africans; perhaps that is the explanation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Moose.

Professor Rotberg.

STATEMENT OF PROF. ROBERT ROTBERG, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Mr. ROTBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will share some oral views in four headings, and then summarize some larger points as quickly as possible.

Since 1981, South Africa has extended its hegemony over the southern African region in a way which was thought to be impossible. It is unchallenged throughout the region and it operates effectively in much of southern Angola. It operates in southern Angola from bases in Namibia and through an insurgency called UNITA. It has done so since 1978.

UNITA is a proxy for South Africa just as the National Resistance Movement is a proxy in Mozambique for South Africa.

Although UNITA has a significant popular ethnic base in southern Angola, it has existed as a military movement significantly in recent years only with massive South African backing. South Africa supplies diesel fuel. South Africa supplies military assistance directly through a battalion of South African troops operating with UNITA. South Africa provides public relations assistance, and so on.

In 1986, it must be understood that UNITA is an important instrument of South African regional policy, and indeed of international policy. South Africa has sought, and seeks, to destabilize and control the region in order to deny the ANC and SWAPO bases and other facilities and staging areas, and also in order to demonstrate to its neighbors and to the majority of its own people that South

Africa is all powerful. Any aid to UNITA is aid to South Africa in several senses.

The second heading is the Soviets and the Cubans. The Soviets and the Cubans, as we know, entered Angola to support the MPLA against South Africa and the United States assisted FNLA and UNITA. The only bulwark against UNITA then and now is in effect the massive numbers of Cubans.

It is thus illogical to seek to diminish Cuban influence by aiding UNITA. Exactly the reverse will be the result, and has been the result. The MPLA needs the Cubans as a buffer so long as there is assistance to UNITA and as long as UNITA is strong.

Now, the position of the Soviet Union has significantly weakened in recent years both in Africa and in Angola. United States aid to Savimbi, indeed, even the proposal of aid to Savimbi, officially, as Mr. Moose has mentioned, enhances and certainly does not diminish the legitimacy and the prestige of a Soviet Union that was faltering in southern Africa and particularly in the Angolan area. The relevance of the Soviet Union was questionable during the last few years. The proposal to aid Savimbi bolsters the Soviet Union in African eyes and certainly emphasizes its relevance in a way which was not thought credible until very recently.

My third point is that South Africa is engulfed in turmoil. We know from the press and from television the depths of despair in South Africa. The policy of the United States has recently, indeed, as recently as yesterday, shifted from being more engaged than constructive to being more constructive and less engaged. We are trying, correctly, to influence the South African Government to release Nelson Mandela, to un-ban the ANC, to cease banning individuals in urban areas, and so on.

To join with South Africa in supporting South Africa and their proxies sends exactly the wrong signal both to Africans within South Africa and, even as significantly, to the Government itself. It sends a signal that is the opposite of the signal that the Assistant Secretary of State and the Secretary of State are trying to send to the South Africans themselves. So it is counterproductive.

Fourth, it is clear to everyone that the cornerstone of constructive engagement regionally was a settlement in Namibia which would bring Namibia to independence through internationally validated means.

In 1982, the United States made the paramount mistake of linking the independence of Namibia to Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Aiding Savimbi and UNITA would compound this folly by making it harder rather than easier for the MPLA to send the Cubans home.

The MPLA desperately seeks a way of ridding itself of the Cubans. Aiding Savimbi makes it, as I have indicated, much harder for the MPLA to release itself of the Cubans. Therefore, aiding Savimbi significantly retards the possibility of independence in Namibia.

It should be clear, Mr. Chairman, that I support H.R. 4276 as well as H.R. 3690.

Let me conclude by summarizing in a slightly different manner a few further points.

It is clear to me that support for UNITA is support for South Africa. It is clear also that to escalate support for Savimbi would escalate regional conflict in an unnecessary way.

It is also clear that helping UNITA makes the Angolan Government much more dependent than it has been on Soviet and Cuban backing. Doing so hardly rewards those in the Angolan Government who have tried to turn to the West and have welcomed better relations with the United States. If outsiders wish to entrench the Cubans, then they should advocate aid to UNITA.

It is clear also, as I have indicated, that although the Government of Angola is prepared to watch the Cubans go, it will do so only when UNITA is weak or weakened.

Finally, the end of Soviet influence in Angola and in the region, Mr. Chairman, depends on diminishing the power and the spread of apartheid, not enhancing it in South Africa and in southern Africa. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor Rotberg, thank you very much for your statement.

We will conclude with Mr. Simes' statement, and then turn to questions.

Mr. Simes.

STATEMENT OF DIMITRI K. SIMES, THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Mr. SIMES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful to the committee for giving me a chance to express my views.

I think we are dealing with a very complex and very emotional issue, and I would like to start with an appeal to discuss it in an analytical and responsible fashion.

I object to the suggestion that assistance to UNITA is an aid to South Africa, as I would object to the suggestion that opposition to such an assistance is an aid to the Soviet Union. I don't think we have to practice excessive rhetoric from the right, or from the left.

I oppose H.R. 4276 because, from my standpoint, both in terms of substance and in terms of procedure, it suggests the wrong solution.

I am not an expert on Africa and I defer to my colleagues as far as reaction of different African States is concerned. I do study the Soviet Union and I know a little bit about Soviet policy in Africa.

Let me suggest that what we are dealing with today is more than a regional issue. We are talking about a policy of Soviet imperial assertiveness, and the first example of that imperial assertiveness was the Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975.

You don't need to be a Russian historian to be well aware that traditionally the Soviet Union was very conservative in using military force far away from the Soviet periphery, particularly in areas where the Soviet Union had no important interests. Yet, encouraged by Vietnam and Watergate and the changing mood in the United States, the Soviet Union opted to intervene in Angola.

I am prepared to argue that without Angola, there would be no Soviet intervention in Ethiopia, and without Ethiopia, I don't know whether the Soviets would intervene in Afghanistan.

I am in favor of détente, but détente with the Soviet Union cannot be maintained unless the Soviets are quite clear what is the invisible geopolitical line the United States would not allow the Soviet Union to cross.

Accordingly, it seems to me a central issue in the United States/Soviet relationship today is how to convey to the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev that adventurism does not pay off.

It seems to me the Soviets are engaged in an important process of foreign policy reassessment. I was intrigued to discover that at the 27th Party Congress Mr. Gorbachev did not put support of national liberation movements as an important Soviet priority. Chances are that the Soviets are responding to movements precisely like UNITA, precisely like Contras in Nicaragua, precisely like rebels in Afghanistan and elsewhere, in beginning to question what price are they willing to pay to maintain and to extend their empire.

If we support Mr. Savimbi, we contribute to the Soviet deliberations in the most desirable way.

Let me also say that as much as I am preoccupied with arms control—and I testified in this very building in support of SALT II and I am proud of it—as much as I am occupied with arms control, I would say weapons do not produce wars; situations produce wars. And if we are serious about the potential of direct confrontation in the United States/Soviet relationship, we should be very careful to discourage the Soviet Union from engaging in situations precisely like Angola, because, otherwise, there may be a pattern of escalation, leading to miscalculation and to disaster.

It is for this reason I am a strong supporter of aid to UNITA.

Let me deal with some objections relating to aid to Savimbi. I know some things I am going to say will be controversial, but in this business, I believe sometimes being blunt is not only inevitable but constructive.

First of all, I am very disturbed by an argument that we should not support UNITA because it cannot win. I do not know whether UNITA can win or not. I do not know whether if, for instance, the Soviets begin to reassess the whole spectrum of their Third World engagements, they would not try to persuade their friends and allies to become more flexible and talk to UNITA. But even if it does not happen, let's face it, we are not a big brother. We are not supposed to have this patronizing attitude to Mr. Savimbi and his associates, who for 10 years, without any United States assistance, have courageously fought the Cubans and the Soviets.

If these people feel they prefer to die standing tall rather than to live on their knees I think it is a choice which we can be expected to respect, and if we can help them to fight with modern weapons rather than stones, it is a perfectly noble choice.

Second, we are told that if we support UNITA, it would be difficult for the MPLA to encourage departure of 35,000 Cuban troops. Frankly, I completely agree with Mr. Rotberg on that. I agree in terms of establishing the fact. If we surrender in Angola, the Cubans can reduce numbers of their troops.

I can only bring you some other good news. If we surrender in Europe, Moscow can also reduce its forces. And if we continue with

preemptive surrender elsewhere, the Soviets can proceed with genuine arms reductions, but to me it sounds like appeasement.

The problem is not with Cuban troops in Angola; the problem is with Cuban troops, 35,000 today, maybe fewer tomorrow, keeping the unpopular regime in power.

The United States, including the United States Congress, reacted with contempt to Mr. Gorbachev's and Babrak Karmal's suggestion that we should accept staged withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan conditioned upon abandoning the Afghan freedom fighters. Why should we have a different standard in the case of Angola? Frankly, that is beyond me.

We are also told that United States aid to UNITA would interfere with diplomatic efforts to grant independence for Namibia. Again I have to agree with Professor Rotberg. It is a problem.

But I recommend to all of you who are preoccupied with independence of Namibia to read the speech delivered at the 27th Party Congress in Moscow by that great leader of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma. Compared to him, leaders of the MPLA sounded like bleeding-heart Western Liberals.

He identified himself as Marxist-Leninist and supported Soviet policy worldwide without qualification. Mr. Nujoma also said the moment he would come to power, he would consider it a moral obligation to support the following movements: The PLO, Mu'ammar Qadhafi's Libya, and the Sandinistas. Moreover, he pledged solidarity with Farabundo Liberation Front in El Salvador. I think it is a rather bold statement from somebody in Mr. Nujoma's position, who is not even yet in power today.

I am in favor of the independence of Namibia. It is precisely Mr. Savimbi and his UNITA fighters who stand between SWAPO and Namibia. Unless we want a Communist dictatorship in Namibia, we have to be very grateful to Mr. Savimbi for the effectiveness of his forces.

Yes; we are in favor of independence of Namibia, but I don't think that it means that we should support this independence at any price and in any format, and I think people of Namibia can do better than to have a Communist dictatorship under Sam Nujoma.

Let me finally deal with the very difficult objection that by aiding UNITA, the United States would be allying itself with South Africa. And again I agree with Mr. Moose and Professor Rotberg. Unfortunately, such a perception in many quarters is inevitable.

I yield to no one in my opposition to apartheid. I also suspect nobody would suggest that Mr. Savimbi is a supporter or sympathizer of apartheid.

But, ladies and gentlemen, if you look on the map, you would understand Mr. Savimbi had a choice between surrender and accepting aid from South Africa and if he had the choice, he was deprived of the choice by the Clark amendment, which you have recently repealed.

Is it not very unfair to criticize UNITA for the putting their fight and the freedom of the Angolan people above their opposition to apartheid in another country?

When you are talking about national liberation movements in the Third World, whether Communist or anti-Communist, right wing or left wing, these are people fighting in a very difficult situa-

tion and some may even call them people who are not sufficiently civilized by our standards because they put their freedom above their life. Well, I wouldn't expect these people to be all the time overly scrupulous in their situations.

I would remind you of a great country, the United States, which was willing to be allied with Stalin against Hitler but nobody would seriously suggest we were fighting for Stalin, I hope. Why would one suggest we would be fighting for South Africa if we support Mr. Savimbi, especially if we believe this is in an American national interest?

Now, how are African countries going to respond to that? Let me make two observations.

When Mr. Savimbi was here in town several months ago, I was intrigued to discover that quite a number of members of his entourage had diplomatic passports issued by a number of African countries. I was very intrigued to find it out because it supports Mr. Bissell's observation that some black African countries are not as opposed to Mr. Savimbi as it may sound.

Furthermore, we support Israel in the Middle East while it is unpopular among most Arab States. We supported Israel even when it was really tough during the oil embargo when the cost to the United States was considerable.

What is going to be the cost of supporting Mr. Savimbi in terms of U.S. African policies? We are constantly warned about some terrible consequences but my impression is that while obviously there will be a great deal of displeasure, it will be primarily on the verbal level, and the bark is going to be much greater than the bite. If Mr. Mengistu is going to be so upset that he would decline our assistance, I suspect the Republic is going to survive.

Finally, I completely agree that it is very important for the U.S. Congress and for the Nation to discuss this very important matter. Yet, enough was already released to the public to make certain that aid to UNITA will not be secret from the American people.

This hearing and many other hearings and our vigorous public debate virtually assure that the Nation is very well informed about the administration's intention to support Mr. Savimbi. But if we are talking about specifics, if we are talking about details, if we are talking about supply schedules, well, if we are going to disclose something like that, what is going to be covert assistance?

If we are seriously concerned about perceptions in Africa, why should we intentionally put ourselves in a situation when we would proceed with actions and statements which literally would needlessly provoke black African States leaving them no other choice but to react very promptly and very negatively?

That is why I oppose H.R. 4276, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Simes.

[The statement of Mr. Simes follows:]

U.S. Aid to UNITA

Dimitri K. Simes

Testimony before the U.S. House Of Representatives

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

March 13, 1986

I would like to thank the Committee for inviting me to discuss U.S. support for the National Union for the Total Independance of Angola (UNITA). The issue is complex and emotional. Yet, on balance I believe it is both in the American interest and morally appropriate to provide UNITA with military assistance as intended by the Reagan Administration.

One reason for controversy over the matter is that it is approached from two different perspectives: the regional and the global. Both are perfectly legitimate. Both deserve careful consideration. But they are not of equal importance.

The civil war in Angola is of considerable geopolitical relevance to the United States because what is involved is more than a competition between rival tribal and ideological factions. The ten year old Soviet-Cuban intervention on behalf of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) inevitably gave the confrontation a crucial East-West dimension. America may be prepared to tolerate -- however unhappily -- a Marxist-Leninist government in Luanda. But the United States has a vital interest

in arresting the pattern of Soviet expansionism which brought MPLA to power.

Traditionally the Soviet Union was conservative in projecting military force to regions far away from the periphery of its empire. The Soviet use of Cuban surrogates in Angola in 1975 was a major departure from a previous pattern. No important Soviet interests were at stake in Angola. The Chinese role was fairly marginal. And detente with the United States -- despite some cracks -- was still very much in place.

Still, despite warnings from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Leonid I. Brezhnev leadership opted to use Cuban proxies to install the MPLA government. South African military presence certainly provided the Kremlin with a convenient excuse. But an excuse should not be confused with a motive. Moscow openly took pride in its ability to change the international "correlation of forces" by bringing to power a friendly "national liberation movement".

Opponents of MPLA in Angola were not the only casualties of the brutal display of Soviet-Cuban force. The success in Angola encouraged the Kremlin to procceed with further Third World adventures. While still cautious and calculating, the Soviets became more willing to take chances in exploiting Third World instabilities. The new Soviet global assertiveness was among key factors behind the collapse of detente.

Today disagreements over regional issues present a principal potential for a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Weapons do not produce wars. Situations do. And as long as the USSR continues its imperial conduct, there will be a danger that the United States will find itself confronted with a choice between surrendering important American interests or risking escalation and miscalculation, leading to a devastating nuclear exchange.

The United States has few interests rivaling the importance of disciplining the Soviet power. And UNITA fighters in Angola led by Mr. Jonas Savimbi offer a unique opportunity to contribute to this management of the Soviet challenge without the risk of a direct superpower confrontation.

That is because UNITA is part of the new phenomenon, namely a whole chain of Third World resistance movements opposing the Soviet Union and its clients. These movements are a major factor in the ongoing reassessment in Moscow of costs and benefits of Third World commitments. Without them it would be much more difficult for the United States to constrain Soviet global ambitions. And there are signs that anti-Soviet resistance movements already have an impact. At the 27th Party Congress in Moscow Mikhail S. Gorbachev tended to downplay Soviet support for national liberation movements. Some credit for that should go to UNITA.

One wants to hope that U.S. assistance to UNITA would either lead to its military victory over the MPLA or to meaningful

negotiations. But even if the only thing UNITA would be able to accomplish is to upgrade the costs of the Soviet-Cuban occupation, it would perform a most valuable service for the United States and for the West in general.

The objections against U.S. aid to UNITA range from manageable to irrelevant. Most of them esentially amount to a recognition that a vigorous containment of the Soviet Union has its political and moral price. Let's face it -- those "uncivilized" enough to risk their lives in the fight for freedom in the Third World rarely feel obliged to be overly scrupulous about the means they employ and the patrons they choose.

What are the arguments against the U.S. involvement on the side of UNITA?

First, some claim that it is both impractical and immoral to support a movement that cannot win. But if American aid to UNITA and similar movements persuade the Soviets that the Reagan doctrine is for real, the Kremlin may opt to declare victory and accept compromise solutions. Anyway, it was the decision of Mr. Savimbi and his followers to engage in a protracted struggle without any U.S. guarantees. It is patronizing to claim that we are supposed to save Angolans, in spite of themselves, by letting UNITA drop dead.

Second, opponents of aid to UNITA warn that a U.S. involvement would make impossible the departure of more than

thirty thousand Cuban troops. But the size of the Cuban force in Angola increased significantly while the United States, under the Clark Amendment, stayed on the sidelines for a decade. Also, a Cuban withdrawal is not an end in itself. Of course, the Cuban military presence can be reduced by encouraging Savimbi's capitulation to the Luanda regime. But to present the consolidation of MPLA control as an accomplishment would be similar to making a case for a preemptive surrender in Europe in order to allow cuts in the Soviet army.

Both Havana and the Luanda regime have made it abundantly clear that the Cuban stage-by-stage withdrawal would not mean the end of the Cuban military advisory role in Angola. Any withdrawal would also be conditional upon the complete abandonment of UNITA. That is exactly the position Gorbachev and his puppets in Kabul take in the case of Afghanistan. Why should this formula be more appealing in the case of Angola?

Third, we are reminded that U.S. aid to UNITA may interfere with diplomatic efforts to grant independence to Namibia. The continuing South African control over this territory is indeed regrettable. But should ending it be a paramount American objective? The answer is yes only if there are minimal assurances that a new Namibian government would not be under Communist control.

Currently UNITA serves as a barrier of sorts between Namibia and Marxist-Leninist SWAPO guerrillas located in Angola.

If Savimbi is defeated, the Namibian independence in all likelihood would mean SWAPO tyranny allied with the Kremlin. Speaking at the 27th Party Congress in Moscow, the SWAPO leader, Sam Nujoma, supported Soviet foreign policy without any qualifications. He also expressed solidarity with the PLO and Farabundo Marti Marxist-Leninist rebels in El Salvador. The continuing effectiveness of Savimbi is a key to keeping this Communist revolutionary from power in Namibia.

Fourth, there are plenty of warnings that by aiding UNITA, the United States would be objectively allying itself with South Africa. Savimbi, of course, is no supporter of apartheid. But forced to choose between surrender and South Africa's helping hand, he opted for the latter. Any real or even perceived affiliation with South Africa is undesirable for the United States. However, the alternative -- failing to stand up to Soviet expansionism -- is worse.

The United States openly allied itself with Stalin against Hitler. No explicit association with South Africa is required to offer aid to Savimbi. It is true that many African states would be unhappy about finding America on the same side with South Africa. But their bark is going to be louder than their bite. Many African nations quietly make arrangements with South Africa. There are even some that are secretly sympathetic to UNITA. Anyway the African dependence upon U.S. food and development assistance is sufficient to prevent a response which would be truly detrimental to American interests.

Finally, opponents of Savimbi complain that an involvement on his behalf would be damaging to GULF oil operations in Cabinda. Interestingly, those who are most vocal in making this argument were never known to be supporters of interests of other American multinational corporations. Similarly, efforts to portray Savimbi as a Maoist and an opportunist simply show that Pat Buchanan has no monopoly on exaggerated and irrelevant rhetoric.

For ten years UNITA has been fighting the MPLA, the Soviets and the Cubans. Its bases are inside Angola. Its area of control goes considerably beyond the border enclave where South African air cover is available. In the last two years the Soviet Union provided up to $2 billion dollars to MPLA. The Luanda army is supported by more than thirty thousand Cubans and hundreds of Soviet instructors. It is armed with modern Soviet MiG-23 combat aircraft, MI-24 helicopter-gunships and T-62 tanks. There is little doubt that UNITA needs anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. There is equally no doubt that only the United States is in a position to provide advanced arms in sufficient numbers.

As far as H.R. 4276 is concerned, I commend the intent of the bill. Giving aid to UNITA is an important matter and should be publicly debated. Yet, the language of the resolution appears to me too restrictive and inconsistent with the nature of covert operations.

Aid to UNITA will be a contribution to a more moderate Soviet foreign policy, a better U.S.-Soviet relationship and to world peace. I hope that the U.S. Congress will not stand in its way.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank the panel. I think all of us have been very impressed with the manner in which you have put forward your arguments.

The committee will proceed under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Stump.

Mr. STUMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moose, you made a statement in which I believe you said you defended the President's right on the covert activity, but you said this would be an abuse of the President's authority. I didn't quite understand your logic there.

Mr. MOOSE. It seems to me, Congressman, that if this President and future Presidents in other situations wish to rely upon the authority which exists in the statutes—I am not an expert on that; you all are, I am not—but if this President or future Presidents wish to rely on statutes that provide the authority to conduct covert actions, it seems to me that reliance upon that authority in this situation now when this action is so widely and publicly known and discussed and described, when there is no color of covertness about it whatsoever, is going to undermine his ability. It will lessen the tendency of people to respect the use of that authority because it will be argued that the only reason for using the authority now is to avoid going to obtain the votes of Congress to get the money to do it. It will be argued that the only way the President can get the money is by reliance on authority that does not require a vote.

It seems to me that this would be harmful to the preservation of this authority.

Mr. STUMP. Dr. Bissell, in your opinion, would the likelihood of a diplomatic settlement increase if Savimbi is weakened?

Mr. BISSELL. The diplomatic settlement, it seems to me, especially the one that is under way at the moment, is a highly complex procedure. It is one that now involves more parties than have been involved to date.

Part of the explanation of why constructive engagement in fact has not obtained a settlement, especially in Namibia, over the course of the 5 years of this administration is that Mr. Savimbi was not involved in the negotiating framework. In his position, as Mr. Simes explained, he was able to stand between SWAPO and Namibia.

I think what is going to happen in the process of American assistance to Savimbi is that there will be an opportunity to bring him into the process so we will have a linkage of the Namibia issue with the internal Angolan civil war, and in that process it will be more likely to obtain a settlement on both scores.

Mr. STUMP. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stokes.

Mr. STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would ask either Professor Rotberg or Mr. Moose to comment for me on this.

The administration tends to equate giving aid to Savimbi and UNITA to patriotism here in the United States. That is, if you are a good American, you should be concerned about freedom fighters in Angola.

In that context, I have heard the statement made that we should be willing to help these people who have thrown off the yoke of colonialism. Just for the purpose of its historical context, am I correct in the sense that when Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau threw off the yoke of colonialism under Portugal after hundreds of years, the United States was on the side of Portugal?

Mr. ROTBERG. Congressman, the Assistant Secretary defers to me. I am happy to suggest that there was a period when the United States was supporting Portugal in Africa as a result of the Azores and other considerations. At the time when Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and so on were able to seek their independence more fruitfully, that is, to the revolution in Portugal, it would probably be unfair to characterize the United States as supporting Portugal at that point.

However, the United States, in the crucial months of 1975 when the processes we are now talking about were beginning to unfold, certainly was supporting covertly and otherwise forces opposed to the government, to the party that is now the Government of Angola. None of the parties was any more legitimate than the others at that point, so that our support, countered by Soviet and Cuban support, was equally credible, equally appropriate.

There was a problem, though, in 1975, in September 1975, when the South Africans invaded Angola from the south to support UNITA and other mechanisms. That, of course, put South Africa and the United States on the same side—also, I might say mainland China, the United States, and South Africa on the same side.

It was the South African intrusion historically which triggered a further escalation of Cuban and Soviet involvement on the side of the MPLA, and then everything we have seen follow.

I would not stand here and make a case for the greater patriotism of any of the sides in the conflict. I think each of the important ones, MPLA and UNITA, is a popular movement. The FNLA was never as popular as the other two, but certainly they both have deep historic roots, the MPLA deeper than UNITA.

Mr. STOKES. Regionally, didn't the Portugese set up a coalition government opposed to the MPLA, the UNITA, and the FNLA, and at that time, rather than our supporting a coalition form of government, both we and the Soviet Union supported a military type of operation there? In fact, our covert support of UNITA went on until 1975 when Congress shut off the funds.

Mr. MOOSE. The Portugese sponsored a conference, a negotiation between the three parties, and that led to what is called the ALVOR agreement, which one side of this controversy maintains was overthrown by Cuban troops and the MPLA.

The ALVOR agreement came at the very beginning of 1975, January 1975. The first United States covert operations in Angola were also authorized in January 1975—which antedated the Soviets' decision to reverse their previous unwillingness to support the MPLA with arms.

The historical record on this is very interesting. During the secret debate in the Senate in December 1975, on the Tunney amendment, which cut off funding out of the contingency fund, the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research presented a classified document detailing the action/reaction cycle of arms

shipments, who invaded who. Trying to get all of that straight is very difficult. I have seen a more recent, reasonably good, more elaborate version of this chronology in an article by Mr. Wayne Smith, a former State Department officer and expert on Cuban affairs. It has quite a lot of material that I had not seen in the public record before. Assistant Secretary Crocker has also recently testified to the sequence of these events. What he said was very illuminating and worth taking a look at it.

Mr. STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ireland.

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moose, you referred to the fact that we shouldn't be seeking a military solution. I think those were your words in this area.

Is not taking the support away and seeing that there is no support for Savimbi—is not that a military solution?

Mr. MOOSE. I so abbreviated my summary of my remarks that perhaps it wasn't clear. I said the costs and implications of giving aid to Savimbi would vary enormously under various circumstances.

The first I referred to was if we went for a military solution. I did not say we should not go for one. I said that the Congress should consider the costs and the implications of going for a military solution.

Mr. IRELAND. Which do you want, a military solution or nonmilitary solution?

Mr. MOOSE. I don't think there will be a military solution one way or the other of the Angolan civil war.

Mr. IRELAND. Clearly you would want the MPLA with its Cuban surrogates and Soviet direction to succeed. You expressed an interest in the fact that you wanted the best possible life for those not only there but in Namibia as well. I take it from what you say that you aspire for those people to have a Communist form of government, as indicated by the current leaders of those movements, supported by whatever necessary repression methods and devices and advisers from the Soviet Union or Cuba, because that indeed is the only alternative.

So if you would allow me, I would say that it indicates to me that you would prefer that to happen. Is that not correct?

Mr. MOOSE. With all respect, sir, that is incorrect. It is quite a startling inference from my remarks.

My preference would be, if I may state my own position rather than having it characterized for me, my preference would be Angola and Namibia free from foreign intervention of any sort.

Mr. IRELAND. Therefore, based on the history of the activity of the Soviet Union, you, in your wisdom, feel that the Soviets would totally withdraw, the Cubans would withdraw and they would not want to have any influence there whatsoever.

Mr. MOOSE. It is a good deal more complicated than that.

Mr. IRELAND. You think that would happen?

Mr. MOOSE. No.

Mr. IRELAND. You think they will be there then?

Mr. MOOSE. No; not necessarily. I think they can probably be negotiated out of there. I think the probability of that is higher than

the probability of our getting them out by giving some aid to Mr. Savimbi.

Mr. IRELAND. That is the other thing I wanted to ask you about. I will be brief.

You talked about being an honest broker in these negotiations and now you say that you can negotiate this out. Can you give me some good examples where a Communist-Marxist regime anywhere in the world has been negotiated away and that, in negotiation, we have succeeded in having them move out?

Mr. MOOSE. I am very glad you asked me that question. Yes, Congressman. The effect of the Lancaster House settlement in Rhodesia, which was negotiated by the British Government with some assistance from the American Government, was to achieve that result. While this was in part, because of the way the Soviet Union handled itself—because of the way they misplayed it—but mainly because of the very adroit way in which the British Government handled the negotiations. Their skill had the effect of bringing to power a government in Zimbabwe which remains to this day very strongly alienated and bitter about the Soviet Union. It was over a year after Zimbabwe independence before a Soviet Ambassador was able to press his credentials.

The independence of Zimbabwe and the manner in which it was achieved is the greatest Soviet reverse in possibly the last 20 years in Africa.

Mr. SIMES. Could I add to that?

It is my recollection that during the civil war in Rhodesia, the Soviets supported Mr. Nkomo and the Chinese and others supported Mr. Mugabe. So it so happened that the Soviet client did not come to power. The Soviets did not suffer reversal because their clients failed to take over to start with.

It so happens that both the MPLA and SWAPO are Soviet clients and one is already in power and one is trying to be in power.

I cannot buy Mr. Moose's parallel.

Mr. IRELAND. I would say to Mr. Moose that the Soviets negotiated away no power whatsoever. They had no power there to negotiate away.

Mr. MOOSE. In all respect, to the contrary, they were thought to have a very strong position and the Patriotic Front was customarily described as "the Soviet-backed patriotic front." It worked out the other way.

Mr. IRELAND. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kastenmeier.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

People differ on who foreign policy belongs to, but I think it belongs to the people. If we have problems with the recent history with respect to other similar problems in other parts of the world, to the extent we can keep a public dialog about what the interests of this country are, I think we are far better off than submerging it in a secret vacuum of covert action.

One of the things that concerns me is that this is part of a general policy. It is not isolated in terms of Angola. It is a policy which says that by increasing American military contributions in an area, we can force a government, a Marxist government or a gov-

ernment which we do not like, to come to a bargaining table and to bargain away certain things.

It has been United States policy true with respect to Nicaragua. I just don't think such a policy works, in Angola, Nicaragua, or any other place. I would solicit your opinion on that point, Mr. Moose.

Mr. MOOSE. I believe that in the real world it became a political reality that there would be some form of aid to Mr. Savimbi. I think that determined the argument that the State Department now makes. I have some sympathy for them.

The argument that aid to Savimbi will help the negotiations is about the only argument they can drum up. That is: if you put a little more pressure on the MPLA, then maybe you can get a negotiation.

I don't agree with that. I think if the United States puts a little more pressure on Luauda, you get more Cubans. Then we would be further away from our goal than we were before.

That is a clear difference of opinion. Someone may argue that the threat that to aid Mr. Savimbi may tend to clarify the minds of the MPLA. Maybe they will get more serious, but it has not worked that way before. There will be more Cubans rather than fewer. I really worry about what happens once we are committed in Angola; the South Africans, with all of their problems pull back; and we are left holding the bag.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Like in Vietnam. I understand it, that is apparently the only justification for us getting involved. Now, for about 10 years the situation has been relatively static with respect to Angola.

The United States has not been aiding Savimbi and the Cubans have been there and the Russians are there in some strength.

You have described the politics of the region, but it seems to me that the administration has the burden of showing why the United States at this point in history, after 10 years, should get involved and why clearly this will help the negotiations.

If that isn't the case, then there has to be another case made and why after the last 10 years with the stabilization there—granted we do not have the sort of presence we would like and the Soviets do have a presence there we don't like—that it is important for us now to take a military initiative, 10 years later, to dislodge them and accept the fact that negotiations have not worked.

Mr. MOOSE. I find that very difficult to understand myself.

Mr. ROTBERG. I agree, Congressman. It is the wrong policy at the wrong time in the wrong place, particularly since the amount of money which is being talked about publicly won't do terribly much good anyway compared to the massive assistance that comes from South Africa.

The Savimbi forces are strong, reasonably secure and, unless we incite the Soviets and the Cubans to increase their numbers, as Mr. Moose just mentioned, it is unlikely that there is any clear and present need or any clear and present danger to involve us.

It is certainly in my view, it certainly cannot help negotiations but will retard negotiations over Angola, over Namibia, and probably over South Africa itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hyde.

Mr. HYDE. Well, I just take a different perspective from Professor Rotberg and Mr. Moose. The strategic importance of the area seems to be overlooked as we try to confine this to the term "Angolan civil war." The stakes are enormously high in minerals, in geostrategic location. Someone said geography is destiny and I think a little broader view is important.

But I would like to ask Mr. Simes, Iran is helping the Mujahadeen fight the Soviet aggressors in Afghanistan. Now, if we help the Mujahadeen, does that make us allies of Iran? Isn't that the analogy being used by the people who say if we help Savimbi, we become united with South Africa?

Mr. SIMES. I think you are absolutely right, Congressman. The analogy is false.

My feeling is that it is a bit hypocritical on the part of black Africans to suggest that they would not understand the nature of American interest in UNITA and to see that this interest is different from the South African interest.

I would also like to remind you that before the Soviets and their Cuban proxies interfered in Angola and actually before they brought their MPLA clients to power, the Organization of African Unity was divided and would not support the MPLA. It is only after the Soviets have proven that might—Soviet might is right, that the Organization of African Unity decided to accept legitimacy of the MPLA, de facto legitimacy.

One final comment on this issue. It is a bit ironic when on one hand we say, well, Mr. Savimbi is guilty because he is in bed with South Africans, and then we say, and because he is in bed with South Africans, why wouldn't we leave him there.

Well, you cannot have it both ways.

Mr. HYDE. I look at it as a man drowning and the lifeguard comes out and he has to answer a few questions as to his purity of motive and character before you permit the lifeguard to save you.

Now, as I look at the situation, the Soviets have put $2 billion into Angola, into the Communist government there. Why are they making such an investment?

Is it just because they don't like apartheid and they want to show the flag? What is their interest in Angola?

Mr. SIMES. Mr. Moose's colleague in Jimmy Carter's State Department, whom I respect very greatly, Andy Young, once said, "The Russians are the greatest racists in the world." Then you want to know how the few black students who study in Moscow are treated in the Soviet capital. You would not believe for a second that the Soviets are genuinely opposed to apartheid.

As you said, Congressman, it is a question of convenience and geopolitics. I also am amused when on one hand we are told the Soviets would like the United States to provide aid to Savimbi because it would allow the Soviets to interfere further and further and further.

Well, they are already more or less in control in Angola to the extent they would like to be. But as you said, they have contributed about $2 billion during the last 2 years.

Mr. Gorbachev faces very serious economic problems at home. He cannot indefinitely spend money on projects like that. I do not know, with due respect to the argument that we should support

Mr. Savimbi in order to support negotiations, I do not know whether negotiations will be promoted or not, but I do know that the Soviets cannot spend $2 billion on Angola and on Mozambique and on something else. Even if we will not help Mr. Savimbi and the courageous Angolan people behind him, very much at least we would deter the Soviets from investing in other adventures and would do it relatively on the cheap.

Mr. HYDE. I know of Mr. Moose's suggestion there are more effective and less costly ways of accomplishing the end of getting the Cubans out of Angola. Mr. Carter's administration was in for several years and nothing much happened except an increase in the Cuban presence.

I remember Andy Young. I was there that night. I was a very impressionable young Member of Congress then in 1975 and Andy Young said why the Russians won't last 6 months. They are worse racists than the Americans.

I remember my friend Mr. Stokes and many other people saying they won't assimilate. They are just going to be helped. I remember the Cubans were described as a stabilizing influence, kind of a good, benign presence there in Angola.

So we cut off aid. We didn't send them a sou, a penny, and the result has been an escalation of the Cuban presence from 9,000 to 35,000.

If we could hold off another 10 years, we might get them up to 100,000 there. The stakes are so high and here we are trying to reenact the Clark amendment to tie the hands of the President, not even give him a covert option. It just boggles my mind.

I want to ask one more question.

Mr. Moose said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 18, and I quote, "In fact, I sometimes wonder whether Savimbi, educated in Marxism and trained by the Maoists, is not still the Communist secret weapon in southern Africa."

In other words, Savimbi is really a mole over there leading those people, fighting the Cubans, and the Soviets are watching this and manipulating all this. Did you really mean that, Mr. Moose?

Mr. MOOSE. Well, I am intrigued by the idea of a man who began his political career as a Marxist, who then became a Maoist, and who, on the public record in recent years, has not backed away entirely from many of his Marxist leanings and statements of earlier years. I wouldn't dismiss entirely the idea that he might go back that direction.

Mr. HYDE. You were never sure Whittaker Chambers or Louie Budenz ever really came over.

Mr. MOOSE. I am not an authority on that. I don't know very much about it.

One can be a secret weapon without being a willing secret weapon. I think that probably our aid to Mr. Savimbi is probably the low-cost way for the Russians to pursue their designs in southern Africa.

Mr. HYDE. I want to understand that. Helping Savimbi helps the Russians.

Mr. MOOSE. I think it does. It gives them an opportunity to make their case and to make their point and to look good with the people we are competing for.

Mr. HYDE. With whom?

Mr. MOOSE. With the Africans. The Russians won't have to do anything. We just shoot ourselves in the foot. The $2 billion Angolan arms bill is primarily hard currency, that the Angolans have paid the Russians.

Why do the Russians do it? It is very good business among other things in addition to being, for them, good politics. So we help them out by shooting ourselves in the foot, incurring the wrath of all of Africa, alienating people in the area, most of the governments, most of the people in the area, by aligning ourselves with a racist regime.

That is how we are perceived. That costs the Russians nothing. We do it all ourselves.

Mr. HYDE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. Yes. I should make it clear that much of this argument is rather esoteric to me because I am not really versed in the geopolitics of these kinds of situations; but I gather, particularly from Mr. Simes, that he is an ardent supporter of what we have come to hear described as the Reagan doctrine of trying to put a greater cost upon Soviet expansion around the world.

I see this, of course, reflected in Angola and Central America and Cambodia and Afghanistan. I am a little unclear as to just what the outcome of all this is going to be and whether or not it is the most effective way of providing for the development of some of these underdeveloped countries around the world for some posture of democracy and freedom.

I would like specifically to inquire, and perhaps Mr. Simes is the best one to ask, how does this policy work in Mozambique? I understand that that country has a similar Marxist government and just from reading the newspaper articles I observed we sent a high-level delegation over there of American corporate interests last year, that that Government seemed to want to divest itself of its Soviet advisers and that we thought it might be sound policy to encourage that by holding out the bait of American assistance and trade. That, it seems to me, is a tactic which does not seem to conform to the application of the Reagan doctrine.

Can you clarify that for me?

Mr. SIMES. Yes, Congressman, with pleasure. I hope we will finally agree.

Mozambique is a perfect example of how diplomacy can be effective if it is coupled with power. Mozambique, as you know, initially was even more radical and more anti-American than Angola.

At the time when, not the U.S. Government, but many members of the U.S. Government and my academic and journalistic colleagues were concentrating on Angola, nobody paid any attention to Mozambique except there was a rather effective guerrilla movement, unfortunately supported primarily at that time by South Africans and by some Portuguese interests.

Mr. Samora Machel has discovered that the Soviets were incapable to put an end to this movement and certainly they have discovered that the Soviets did not offer enough economic assistance to stabilize the situation in the country, which would prevent Renamo from gaining supporters among the people of Mozambique.

It is at that point that the Government of Mozambique adopted a more flexible line vis-a-vis South Africa and vis-a-vis the United States. There were a number of signals from Mozambique directed to the United States and I credit the Reagan administration for understanding them and for being sufficiently flexible in responding to Marxist Mozambique, as long as it was willing to distance itself a little bit from the Soviet Union.

No similar signals came from Angola, at least no signals I am aware of. As far as the Reagan doctrine is concerned, in general I have to confess, while I support the doctrine, I am not sure I would support some of the reasons provided by the administration in support of it and I think a lot of rhetoric has been counterproductive and excessive. But it is not just President Reagan, but people like Savimbi, like Mujahadeen, who by fighting against Soviet expansionism on their own, very often without American assistance who were true architects of this new approach to containing Soviet Third World assertiveness.

They came to the United States and offered this country something literally on a silver platter and the genius of Ronald Reagan was in his ability to seize the opportunity offered by Savimbi and others like him.

Mr. BROWN. You mentioned Afghanistan. Assuming that at some point both the Soviets and the United States reach the conclusion that they are wasting a lot of money and Afghan lives over there, and Soviet lives, what is the likely outcome in terms of a Government of Afghanistan at the end of the hostility? I am looking for some indication here that we are going to have a government that projects freedom and democracy in Afghanistan.

Is that the goal?

Mr. SIMES. I hope so.

Mr. BROWN. Is there any possibility?

Mr. SIMES. I think that there is a possibility, but I would be less than candid with you if I would say that there is a great deal of probability. Certainly as long as the Soviet Union is willing to support Karmal in Kabul and dos Santos in Luanda, I don't think rebel leaders and their movements will be able to succeed.

That is why in my testimony I focused not specifically on the situation on the ground in Angola but precisely on upgrading the global costs of Soviet expansionism across the board, trying to persuade Mr. Gorbachev that this kind of policy simply is a non-starter.

It should be brought home to the Kremlin that it is too costly and will seriously damage the relationship with the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cheney.

Mr. CHENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to follow up on this general area.

My recollection—I can't claim to be an expert in Africa at all. I had some involvement 10 years ago, at the time that the then-Ford administration was active and the Senate shut off the program in Angola with the Clark amendment.

My recollection of it is—and I would be interested in Mr. Moose or Professor Rotberg responding—we went through a sequence, it seems to me, of collapse of our position in Southeast Asia, all the agony in the United States, the final collapse that followed in part,

some of us felt at the time, because Congress failed to carry through on certain financial commitments to the South Vietnamese Government as the North Vietnamese invaded.

Then in Angola in 1975, an operation that had been approved by the appropriate authorities on the Hill until it became public, was leaked and then the Senate moved and passed the Clark amendment.

We all know what came after that. But when I look back over those 10 or 11 years, again, not being an expert on the subject, I see a whole pattern across the world. It is a pattern of a willingness on the part of the Soviets to use military force, either directly, or indirectly through their surrogates, the Cubans, to establish and to prop up Marxist-Leninist regimes. It includes outright invasion of Afghanistan, where they walked in and apparently killed the puppet they put in power first and replaced him with another, and we now have 120,000 Soviet troops there today, and about a fourth of the Afghani population are refugees.

We see it in Ethiopia and we see it in Angola. We see it in Nicaragua. And someone suggests even in Cambodia.

Mr. BROWN. South Yemen.

Mr. CHENEY. South Yemen. In light of that pattern of developments, we need to be concerned not only with the specific situation in Angola, but this broader trend across the world. Many of us believe that, given that reality—and few have been before the committee who would dispute those facts I have just recited—given that reality, it is vitally important that the administration have a variety of tools to respond, to make it clear to the Soviets that what they have done for the last 10 years they will not be able to do for the next 10 years.

And one of those tools has to be covert actions, covert operations. What we have here—and I know the sincere motives of my friends on the other side of the aisle, yet 8 out of 10 Democratic members of the committee have sponsored the resolution, but nobody on this side has—is a misguided effort that in effect would destroy one of the vital tools the President needs to be able to respond to that worldwide threat.

Where am I wrong in my analysis?

Mr. MOOSE. I believe that the historical facts about what the Russians have done are about as you present them. That is what they have done. We must be concerned about that.

We must deal with the problems that are presented when the Russians become involved in these situations on the basis of understanding the nature of the situations themselves. We would be very foolish to disregard the realities of these situations as we devise a strategy for dealing with the Russians.

We disregarded the realities of the situation in 1975 and produced exactly the opposite result from what we had intended to produce. We played an important part in upsetting the ALVOR agreement.

We were perhaps the first or very early on involved in starting the covert process aimed at upsetting the ALVOR agreement. And we encouraged the South Africans to go into Angola.

We stirred up a situation which produced a result that was quite unexpected and quite the opposite of what we intended. This happened because we didn't look at the realities of the situation.

Mr. CHENEY. We also during that period of time, again, I am not an expert in Portuguese politics, but when the Salazar regime collapsed, we came very close to having a Communist regime established in Portugal and it was through United States involvement and efforts in a number of areas we were successful and forestalled that.

Is there anyplace in Africa where either you, Professor Rotberg, or you, Mr. Moose, would think covert operations, covert action is justified?

Mr. MOOSE. I said at the outset that I believe the President needs the authority to conduct covert operations and I would like to see that remain intact. I can't think offhand of anyplace in Africa right now.

I would like to see the President—I suggested this in the Carter administration—use our assets in a number of ways in order to hasten majority rule in South Africa.

I think probably we ought to put our best minds to determine how we could bring about a majority rule government there quickly.

Mr. CHENEY. Not where we have Soviet presence.

Professor Rotberg.

Mr. ROTBERG. I think these are very important questions and I think clearly the President needs the authority to exercise covert action and it is conceivable that there are many instances where this need be done.

In the case of this insurgency and this war, this may not be the right way to accomplish the objectives.

Mr. CHENEY. My time has about expired. Is there anyplace in Africa today where you would support covert action?

Mr. ROTBERG. There may be lots of places, but covert action of different kinds. Supporting Savimbi in this way is not helpful in this situation because the larger stake is southern Africa and South Africa and supporting a South African proxy for the reasons I have mentioned, doesn't——

Mr. CHENEY. My time has expired and I don't mean to interrupt, but again, that does not respond at all to the set of historical facts that Mr. Moose agrees has been there for the last 10 years, of Soviet expansion across the globe.

Mr. ROTBERG. With respect, I think it does because there is a central point which is that the only standing the Soviet Union has in southern Africa and in most of Africa is the fact that it is the court of last resort for antiwhite South African insurgencies.

Mr. CHENEY. Is that why they are in Ethiopia?

Mr. ROTBERG. That is one of the many reasons why they have standing in most of Africa. Ethiopia is a very specific case. We can go back there if we wish, but the important point is if we give them less legitimacy by not supporting the Savimbi case, the Soviets will have less credibility, less of a role in Angola.

We will weaken the Soviets by not supporting the Savimbi insurgency. That is why those who urge—I say this with deep respect—

that we support the Savimbi case really don't understand the regional context and the importance of the South African struggle.

Mr. MOOSE. May I add, I think we have an asset we don't talk about in Africa very much. I am a banker. I travelled around Africa a great deal.

Our greatest weapon in Africa is our economy. The West's greatest asset in dealing with Africa is the fact that we have markets, we have capital and we have technology and the Africans want it.

They need these things very desperately. The Russians can't offer them any of that and that is the reason why we see Marxist regime after Marxist regime that turns and wants to find a way to relate it in a meaningful way.

The really subversive American activity in Africa, subversive of Russian interest and positive in promoting of our own interest, is our economic strength. But we don't talk about it.

I think America's economic might, its markets, the capital of the free world, is terribly much more appropriate to most of Africa's problems today than clandestine intelligence operations—although they may have a place somewhere.

Mr. CHENEY. I would love to respond, but I have used my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to start by making it clear for myself at least in response to my friend from Wyoming, and I think I probably speak for all the Democrats, as well, that we are not opposed to covert activity as a matter of principle, but rather the question is will it advance the interests of the United States in a given situation as we view those interests.

I think we do have differences on that from time to time. But we are supporting some covert activity and some of it is not very controversial in this committee. So I think it should be made clear that we are not opposed to covert activity as a tool of foreign policy.

It is a question of whether we think it will advance the interests of the United States given the circumstances that we are talking about.

As I try to assess the wisdom of this policy, it seems to me the question is whether the goal articulated by the administration, which the Secretary of State has identified as promoting negotiations between Mr. Savimbi and the MPLA government, is likely to be achieved, and weigh that against the costs or potential costs of the policy itself.

Now, we have talked about a number of these areas and I don't want to beat a dead horse, but as I see it, the question is are we likely to achieve negotiations, successful negotiations, by pursuing a policy of aiding Mr. Savimbi. And one should weigh that likelihood or lack of likelihood against the costs.

The potential costs include the perception that we are allied with South Africa. I know you have all addressed that issue in different ways and put different weight on the perception of that alliance with South Africa.

A second potential cost is a weakening of our ability to play the honest broker role in southern Africa political issues and I know you have different views about that. Another potential cost is forc-

ing the Government of Angola to become more dependent, rather than less dependent, upon the Soviet and Cubans.

Another potential cost which has not been discussed and I would like to address briefly, at least a potential cost from my perspective, is that we will here again be introducing another divisive foreign policy debate in our national community and while that is not necessarily unusual or bad, it does relate I think to the question of sustainability of policy.

One of the problems we have had in Central America is that we have been unable to agree in terms of broad consensus with the policy of aiding the Contra forces. My friends on the other side are impatient with some of us Democrats because we don't agree, but the fact of the matter is there is not a broad consensus on the wisdom of pursuing that policy.

When that is true in a democracy, it seems to me it is generally not a sustainable policy and, therefore, isn't going to work. My question to the panelists is, focusing on this one potential disadvantage of the policy, should we be concerned at all about this as a problem? Is this a sustainable policy?

Will it work? Aren't we introducing another issue which will produce great argument and debate which is legitimate in itself but which may not enable us to be effective in the pursuit of this goal of promoting negotiations? Is it a legitimate consideration and, if so, what do you think about it?

Mr. BISSELL. Could I address that briefly because I tried to raise the issue of sustainability in my comments. I think it is inextricably linked to the original issue you raise, that is, how does this policy of assistance increase the chances for negotiation?

I understand the Secretary of State has addressed this issue and I think he has a very healthy framework for looking at that question. We have both within the MPLA, as well as within UNITA, the two principal fighting parties, a number of factions, and there is a faction within each that would argue for military victory which this country is not interested in supporting. What the U.S. wants is a policy that will convince each of those factions on each side that a military victory is not possible.

That is when you will get negotiations. So as a result, what we are dealing with in terms of assessments that I have seen in public is a situation in which the military buildup on the MPLA side in the last 12 months has been very significant, both in the area of aircraft and tanks. In that context the principal American contribution is, in fact, specific kinds of American technology to deal with that heavy weaponry, not in terms of American commitment of men or enormous amounts of money, but specific kinds of technology that are critical.

So sustainability actually becomes a much simpler issue. We are not talking about funding a $300 million war. We are talking about specific kinds of technology. I think in that sense it should be highly sustainable.

Mr. MCHUGH. I would be interested in other comments. Thank you.

Mr. SIMES. I have to confess that I am a little bit unhappy when spokesmen for the administration suggest that the main rationale

for supporting Savimbi is to make, as you put it, successful negotiations in Angola possible.

Mr. McHUGH. I understand. You would say and have said here that certainly another legitimate and important goal is to make the Soviets pay a price and, therefore become more realistic in dealing with us.

Mr. SIMES. Absolutely. I would add to that while I do not know whether negotiations would become possible if you decide to endorse the administration's request, I do know that no meaningful negotiations would be possible if Mr. Savimbi is abandoned by the United States.

Let me address a principal question because I think really it is critical to the debate. I think we owe it to this country and, as a matter of fact, to Mr. Savimbi, to be damn serious when we discuss what we are going to do about him and about his movement.

If we believe that we cannot support him, if we believe that all we are going to give him is peanuts, and if we will give him peanuts today only to withdraw them tomorrow, I have to say with a great deal of regret, it is better not to get involved.

It would be most unfortunate if we do enough to create illusions on the part of Mr. Savimbi, but not enough really to help him. Let me make one final observation precisely because I am not an expert on Angola and Africa. I probably would not be as excited about this issue as I am if I felt that all our discussion today is about Angola and about Mr. Savimbi.

You just mentioned Contras and it is also a very controversial issue. Afghanistan was mentioned.

It is less controversial but quite frankly, we all know that in terms of the human rights violations, Afghan rebels are worse than Nicaraguan Contras and UNITA. The reason: they are both less organized and more abused.

Now, you go to Cambodia and you discover there is Mr. Pol Pot and we don't want to have anything to do with him. So let's be intellectually honest with ourselves.

If you decide to apply this very vigorous, extremely scrupulous standard, then you say all the so-called freedom fighters, they are not quite knights on white horses and whether they serve our interests or not, let them drop dead.

If that is the decision, I would not personally approve it, but it would be an intellectually honest decision. But when we look at all these various situations and pretend, well, this is a particular case, in other cases we would support freedom fighters, I just think we are substituting tactical excuses for strategic reluctance to engage the Soviets in the Third World.

Mr. MOOSE. I will make a brief comment in response to your question, "Is this a sustainable policy?" I interpreted the question to be: "Is this a policy that is apt to be sustained here in the United States among the American public and the Congress?"

It is already controversial policy. That is obvious. So we know we are dealing with something complicated. The irony of the Angolan intervention in 1975 was that Secretary Kissinger's primary motive was to try to demonstrate American resolve.

That is almost a quote. He said that some place. What he did turned out to be indeed quite the opposite.

It was not a sustainable operation as the controversy grew. Facts become known. The funding procedure, in fact, was a very major factor in turning the Congress against the 1975 intervention. I think that is directly relevant to the bill.

But the fact that this policy might not be an easily sustainable one, of course, is not my reason for opposing it. I don't think that it makes sense. That is my reason.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor Rotberg, I understand you may have to catch an airplane, and if you do, we certainly understand that. We express our appreciation to you for your presence and your contribution.

We will begin a second round of questioning. Feel free to leave at any point.

Mr. ROTBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McEwen.

Mr. MCEWEN. I do have a question for you, Mr. Rotberg, if I may.

First of all, may I say I find it most enlightening—given the option of United States covert assistance and to look at the situation in Africa, and with the instrument of starvation being employed in Ethiopia and Qadhafi's efforts for worldwide terrorism in Libya and we could use other examples—that the only place that the former Assistant Secretary can discover in his mind, where the best and the brightest minds should be employed, would be against South Africa.

It certainly is revealing and eliminates a series of other questions that I would needlessly pursue, except to ask concerning your belief that the economic interests are the No. 1 tool at the disposal of democracies and free enterprise in the free world.

Your banking interests, which you support, do they have any investments in Chevron or Angola Gulf?

Mr. MOOSE. None.

Mr. MCEWEN. If I could follow on the parallel that you drew between Zimbabwe and Angola, how many troops did the Soviet Union or Cuba have in Rhodesia at the time of the parallel that you drew for the committee?

Mr. MOOSE. There were Soviet advisers and probably some Cuban advisers in Mozambique associated with the SWAPO forces there. I don't think anybody ever—I never saw a number on that higher than 1,000 or maybe 1,500 or so.

There were none in a combat role as far as we know. I think that is relevant because those forces were based there. That was their sanctuary, as it were, to attack Rhodesia.

Mr. MCEWEN. So a negotiation by the Soviets in Zimbabwe would be an appropriate parallel to draw with the situation currently going on in Angola between Zimbabwe and Cuban troops?

Mr. MOOSE. I thought what we were talking about at the time is the general proposition of negotiations in Africa involving very strongly entrenched Soviet interests and arms activities and all the rest, they are vying for a position.

We are vying for a position there, contending parties and so forth. Is there any instance in which they have ever lost in that process?

Mr. McEwen. Maybe that is part of the problem. I understand the question to be the lack of negotiations in which they have negotiated away territory, and I believe that obviously the parallel cannot be properly drawn.

Mr. Moose. I didn't interpret the question and didn't answer it in that way.

Mr. McEwen. Mr. Rotberg, in your testimony you mentioned helping UNITA hardly helps those in the Angolan Government who have tried to turn to the West and have welcomed better relations with the United States. Can you help me there as to who in the Angolan Government is seeking to improve relations with the United States and the West?

Mr. Rotberg. Yes, Mr. Congressman, without particularizing them, it has been a long and important effort on the part of the State Department to bring about a concordance of views between the Angolan Government and the United States on a number of issues. They have succeeded to some extent.

I think we could characterize the entire Angolan Government in its present form and in many of its past constituencies as being better disposed to the West than at earlier times. This vitiates that particular success, modest though the success has been in terms of fundamental alteration of policy.

Mr. McEwen. But as those of us who deal on one-on-one, person-to-person, operation-on-operation relationships in these intergovernmental affairs, you really can't give us anything tangible or substantive other than your impression that perhaps there are those that would be more responsive if we were to turn it over wholesale.

Mr. Rotberg. No; my point is very simple, Mr. Congressman. It is not that there are some individuals who are more disposed and some who are not, which is, of course, true. There must be some, and we could particularize those, but the salient point for me is that the Government of Angola and, therefore, the MPLA Government of Angola has for several years been well disposed to the United States and, particularly, as Mr. Moose mentioned, to United States capital, not only Chevron, not only Gulf, but also banking interests and that momentum, I think, was riding very high until the notion was put abroad for various other reasons that the United States should support the leading enemy of the constituted Government of Angola.

Mr. McEwen. With the United States having placed Angola in a protective cocoon for a decade—and I suppose some believe it expired just months before we were to have this rapprochement between the Angolan Government and the West—and if the Clark amendment had not been repealed, within weeks we were probably just about to get there. How much longer would they have needed in order to accomplish these welcomings of better relations for the United States?

Mr. Rotberg. I am not sure I follow you. It is not clear that the Clark amendment prevented the defeat of insurgents UNITA and FNLA. It is not clear to me the Clark amendment was decisive in preventing something from happening but it was certainly instrumental in making it very difficult.

Mr. MCEWEN. You suggest we should continue the policy of the last 10 years and not give support to Savimbi?

Mr. ROTBERG. Correct.

Mr. MCEWEN. We have tried your policy now for an entire decade. My question is how much longer and at what juncture will the rapprochement begin, so that we can know at what point, if it doesn't appear, we should look for alternative policies.

Mr. ROTBERG. I would point you to a date, and I could supply the committee with a precise time. It might be 1982, 1983. I think if one looks very carefully at the record of United States-Angolan relations, those relations have been much improved, that is both to private and public involvement with the Government of Angola.

It would be really shooting ourselves in the foot to do otherwise.

Mr. MCEWEN. And better relations with the United States regardless of the conditions, better economic ties with the United States regardless of the conditions of the populace really is our goal? Should be our goal?

Mr. ROTBERG. I think it is very important to look at the populace of Angola and to understand that the Central Railway of Angola has not operated for more than 10 years now. The last 8 years it was largely because of the success of the insurgency. Warfare in the country has been spread by both sides but certainly by adding to the warfare, even if it were a good policy, adding to the Savimbi side of the warfare would not permit the war to diminish in the countryside.

Mr. MCEWEN. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Professor Rotberg. We will start a second round. We have had our witnesses here quite awhile so I will ask my colleagues to exercise restraint.

Mr. Stump.

Mr. STUMP. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stokes.

Mr. STOKES. I think I have one more question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moose, let me ask you to comment on this. From everything I know, the majority of American people are opposed to apartheid in South Africa. I believe also that our Government has made it clear through its statements that officially we are opposed to the Government policy of apartheid.

I think that the officials who may have made a decision to give this aid to UNITA have done so in good faith. I think that when they say in response to the fact that by giving aid to UNITA we are getting in bed with South Africa, they differentiate their action by saying, yes, South Africa is giving aid to UNITA and we are giving aid to UNITA but we are doing it for different reasons and that we are there on the side of freedom fighters, that we are opposing Marxism and communism.

I know in Professor Rotberg's article in the Christian Science Monitor he had made reference to the fact that the destabilization of Angola is but a part of South Africa's policy of keeping the southern African region crippled and under its thumb. Then he goes on further in his article and ends it up by saying, "neither covert nor overt aid to UNITA is in the self interest of the United States nor does it even make sense for rabid anti-Cubans in Miami or for those who believe attacking the Soviets is the best defense

against militant Marxism. The end to Soviet influence in Angola and in the region depends on diminishing the power and spread of apartheid, not the reverse."

I just wonder if you can explain how you would explain to our Government that our being aligned there does aid South Africa in the destabilization of that part of Africa and also how it aids the spread of apartheid.

Mr. MOOSE. South Africa is a very important part of this equation. Part of the problem I have with Congressman McEwen's reasoning, for example, about why this thing didn't happen or why something else didn't happen is precisely because he omits the South African dimension.

It is not just the United States, the MPLA and the Communists. One must add the South Africans for they are a critical player in all this. Now, how would I explain it?

The South Africans have been continuously involved in Angola going back to 1975. They have supported and sustained Savimbi all that time. They have a combat maneuver battalion in Angola. They fly air strikes and air cover. They are continuously engaged because they consider the southern part of Angola to be the perimeter of their defense of Namibia—which they hold illegally—the independence of which has been a goal of five American administrations going back to the sixties.

I think South Africans believe that the front line of the defense of South Africa is in southern Angola. That is the reason why they have their forces there and have spent an enormous amount of money on it.

The South Africans say that they are in Angola fighting Communists who are conspiring to overrun all of southern Africa. They see themselves as the bulwark against communism and that everything that is happening in South Africa is part of a Communist total onslaught.

Much of the rest of the world believes, as I do, that what is happening in South Africa is a result of the repression of the black population of South Africa. The Communists don't have very much to do with it except to take such advantage of it as they can.

As I say, the South Africans see their line of defense in southern Angola. If they suddenly are joined by a United States that provides arms to Savimbi, every gun that we send Savimbi, every radio we send him, every truck we send him is one more that the South Africans can use for the repression of their own population.

They are going to view our joining them as material assistance, but much more importantly, diplomatic assistance to the extent that it enables them to shore up their own external defense and internal security. It will serve to preserve the system of apartheid.

Happily, I don't think apartheid can spread to anyplace else in the world. I think it is a unique condition there. This is why I think our joining Savimbi is going to be viewed by South Africa as a good thing, and by other people as a bad thing.

Mr. STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hyde.

Mr. HYDE. In other words, if we don't help Savimbi, then South Africa has to help Savimbi and we bleed South Africa. The trucks and the resources South Africa has to give Savimbi are that much

less they have to repress their own people. Hence it is a good, moral thing to not help Savimbi and to drain resources and assets out of South Africa, is that it?

Mr. MOOSE. I don't try to make a moral case out of it. I just think it is illogical and does not make sense.

Mr. HYDE. Isn't it possible South Africa is very interested in Angola and in SWAPO and the ANC because they are Soviet instrumentalities and because South Africa fears that the Soviets have their eyes on South Africa due to its geostrategic location and its mineral resources, and that as long as SWAPO and the Communist forces—which are formidable, 2 billion dollars' worth, Mig-23's, Cuban troops—are there that they have an interest in fighting those people back? So it is a question of which comes first, the chicken or the egg.

Your view is that if the Government in South Africa would just fold up and turn it over to Mandela or whomsoever, then the Russians would fold up their tents and leave Angola.

Mr. MOOSE. No; that is not my view. My view is the South Africans are illegally occupying Namibia. That is the view the entire world holds and that there is no justification whatsoever for them to be. The question of fighting SWAPO because it is Communist does not arise.

If they had given it its independence, there wouldn't be any SWAPO; wouldn't be any Communist influence there; and to justify them in the illegal possession of that territory by saying they are fighting the Russians who are trying to take something away from them that they hold illegally is a little too complicated.

Mr. HYDE. You don't think that the South Africans have a legitimate concern that the Government of Namibia would be a Communist government?

Mr. MOOSE. The South Africans have no legitimate right to hold Namibia whatsoever. The entire world agrees on that.

Mr. HYDE. Of course, that is not what I said. I said do they have a legitimate concern that a country right next to theirs would be a Communist revolutionary government?

Have they got a legitimate interest in that?

Mr. MOOSE. Of course they do, and they have done everything they can to promote it.

Mr. HYDE. To promote what?

Mr. MOOSE. To promote a Communist government.

Mr. HYDE. If the South Africans just leave, the Communists would not dominate Namibia, is that it?

Mr. MOOSE. If they had given them independence back in the sixties as they were supposed to, there would be no reason to be a Communist movement there.

Mr. HYDE. Dr. Bissell, have you some comment on this question of which came first, the chicken or the egg, and if South Africa would just leave and apartheid would leave, the Russians and the Cubans would lose their reason for being there and would be speedily shown the gate?

Mr. BISSELL. The Russians and Cubans like a vacuum. They would happily occupy it. But there is an important question here, which is the question of South Africa's view of what is going on.

What I found there is a real ambivalence about American support for UNITA.

There is an ambivalence because they are not sure what lies behind it politically. They have many views and there are many scars in South Africa with regard to the 1975–76 period when they view that they were given an American green light to support Savimbi and then American support was withdrawn so they are very concerned about what this means.

I worry about the extent to which it becomes a political football among the American public, and I mean a football in the worse sense, not in the sense of a healthy, constructive debate, but in the sense of being booted around for partisan reasons.

Mr. SIMES. When I was in South Africa with Mr. Rotberg about a year ago we had difficulty finding a single South African official who would not complain about great financial burden of Namibia. They would say that they accept that Namibia is going to be independent sooner or later.

Now they are essentially subsidizing the territory. They would like to get out but they would like to find a way that would provide against SWAPO takeover.

In his comments at the 27th Congress Mr. Nujoma declared support of the ANC. When Mr. Nujoma is telling South Africans that the first thing he would do when in power would be to support the ANC, he obviously discouraged Pretoria from compromising on Namibia.

That is simply to say that when we are trying to achieve independence of Namibia, we have to address the SWAPO problem and UNITA is a part, as Professor Bissell said, of the solution.

Mr. HYDE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kastenmeier.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is a form of what I suppose would be referred to as military intervention, whether overt or covert.

My question is in a larger context, that is to say, in terms of commitment of U.S. resources and where this leads. Nicaragua is a model for this.

I guess my question is, should we not be concerned about this large dedication of resources, where it may lead in terms of how much we are going to have to do to be effective once we embark on this course and to achieve what it is that the policy says we should be able to achieve and at the same time, confront this in several other places in the world, Afghanistan possibly, Kampuchea, possibly, and elsewhere, all with a similar demand on annually increased resources and we see these—as I said, these are not modest increments.

Should we not be concerned about the implications of such a policy?

Mr. MOOSE. I would say that none of us here in this room certainly would want to turn down a good and a noble and a wise thing in terms of U.S. policy simply because it would be very costly. Indeed, we would all agree that if the cause was right and if the strategy were correct, we would pay whatever the price in order to do it.

But I think we need to be clear what it is we are trying to do. One of the reasons why I asked in my statement whether we are trying to increase Savimbi's negotiating position—which implies that we can let him go at some point—or whether we are trying to bleed the Russians by getting them to spend a little bit more; or whether we are going for a military victory of UNITA over the MPLA.

Each of those implies to me a different level of resources and ought to be examined. That is your job here. That is what you do. You examine how much it would cost in material terms to do any one of these things. Then you look at how you are going to go about them.

The last time we intervened in Angola we did it through Zaire. I am sure that is what they are planning to do this time. So we fly supplies into Zaire and probably Zairians fly them down someplace close to the Angola border. Then we get a contractor to take them from there and we send some radios in, when the radios don't work, we send in somebody to fix them and then somebody to teach them how to use the radios. At some point the South Africans, after we are good and involved in this say, "look, we have got a lot of problems back here in Namibia with SWAPO; you guys hang on and we are going to fight SWAPO and we will be back in a minute." So the South Africans pull out their maneuver battalion, take out their air cover, take out the air lift, and then we go in and pick up the slack.

I am not saying that Angola is going to be Vietnam, but I am just saying you must look logically at the cost. Now, Mr. Mobutu has never been known to do anything for free, and he says; "Wait a minute; you are using my stuff. I have supplied some of my equipment, my airlift, my airplanes; I would like to have a little more foreign aid. Let's talk about that."

It is these kinds of costs that I think you have to look at at the beginning of the thing rather than after you get into it and it seems to me that that is the reason why the bill is a good idea because it compels—it is compelling it right now, this is a good thing, to examine the cost of what you are embarking upon.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Dr. Bissell.

Mr. BISSELL. I am a firm supporter of proportionality. One does not just, pell-mell, jump into interventions here and everywhere. My only problem with proportionality and its examination is that it is, as Dick suggested, a relatively technical issue and you have to deal with a great deal of detail, which this committee, as well as the committee in the other House, should be examining.

I would hope they have been looking at for some months ever since the issue was raised last October. But I don't think it is something that is particularly well served by this bill in the sense that it is not an issue of public debate.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. The problem is when a program is covert, there is no public debate about proportionality, and Government policies are not put into the equation of where we are at any given time on a number of similar ventures or programs.

Mr. SIMES. Let me just say briefly that I am less interventionist than Mr. Moose. I would not go anyplace and pay any price for anything short of United States interests and Angola is not one of

them. It bothers me, of course, that very often people who set up this very high standard, would not find a single place where the United States should make a commitment. People who are asking our support are always accused of not being good enough.

But I think you asked a crucial question. As far as I am concerned, you have to be very careful what you are willing to pay at a particular place in pursuit of a particular objective.

You know that in support of vital interests you are willing to go all the way, including using your military force. In support of objectives which are important, but less than vital, you are willing to go half of the way and a quarter of the way.

To suggest that once you made step A you are bound to make step B, makes an effective global policy is impossible. That brings me to another reason I am uncomfortable with H.R. 4276.

You are much more experienced in congressional matters than I am, but I am very concerned that the public debate would force the administration to make all the wonderful pronouncements about freedom fighters stopping communism.

There would be so much excessive rhetoric that we really would commit ourselves to Savimbi and to his success much more than we really want. So if you want to make a calibrated commitment, if you want to be careful, do it covertly.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cheney.

Mr. CHENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moose, just by way of followup, it seems to me that if there were to be a choice between overt or covert action, and, of course, the resolution is directed in part to that fundamental choice, wouldn't it be normal to expect that if there were black African regimes who did, in fact, want to cooperate, that they would prefer a covert operation so that they could maintain the concept of deniability? Isn't that a logical thing for them to want?

Mr. MOOSE. They probably would prefer that, but it is also a question of is it practical. My view, it isn't, so it doesn't matter whether they prefer it. They are not apt to get it.

Mr. CHENEY. Well——

Mr. MOOSE. It can be denied, yes; you are right.

Mr. CHENEY. Thank you.

Second, again, if I can come back to this notion that Angola is part of a global problem: Obviously there are issues that relate specifically to Angola, issues that relate to the region of South Africa, Central America, and so forth, but ultimately in many of these places we still have this East/West conflict, Soviet presence, Cuban military presence.

What I hear you saying is that there are very few places, perhaps none, where you would be prepared to use American troops to intervene, that there are very few places, perhaps none of these I have mentioned, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, where you would be prepared to use covert action. That leaves us with negotiations, and negotiations is the cry we hear around here all the time.

It is the cry we are going to hear on Nicaragua when we debate it on the floor next week: Negotiate, negotiate, negotiate. Diplomacy, that is the answer.

Again, I come back to the question that was asked early on. I am not familiar with a single situation in which a Marxist regime in power, supported by Soviet/Cuban military personnel, and so forth, has ever negotiated away its position. Are you aware of any such situation?

Mr. MOOSE. I would reserve my answer on that to make a study of it. Offhand, I can't think of one.

Mr. CHENEY. Why should we have any expectation at all, whether it be Nicaragua or Angola or any of these other locations, that negotiations are the answer?

Mr. MOOSE. In this particular case, the reason would be that there is good self-interest on the part of the governing party in Angola to want to be rid of the burden of having the Cuban forces there and the Soviet advisers. Before I stop, let me just say for the record that you have characterized my position on a whole variety of subjects in a way I don't agree with at all.

I didn't say we should never oppose the Russians anyplace and we should never have a covert, clandestine operation in place. I didn't say it. That is not my position.

Mr. CHENEY. We have four specific situations, Afghanistan——

Mr. MOOSE. Right.

Mr. CHENEY. What would your policy be there?

Mr. MOOSE. I am altogether in favor of what we are doing.

Mr. CHENEY. Ethiopia?

Mr. MOOSE. Ethiopia is a very complicated case. There are a lot of things I would like to do to the Cubans and Russians in Ethiopia. I wouldn't like to foment an Ethiopian civil war, though by playing on the factions in Ethiopia in the way that might appeal to some people organizing clandestine operations, but there are a lot of ugly things that ought to be done to them.

Mr. CHENEY. What about Nicaragua?

Mr. MOOSE. Nicaragua I think we are probably off on the wrong foot there altogether, because going way back we ignored the effect of the Somoza regime backed by the United States and created a situation that we are now having to deal with.

Mr. CHENEY. We obviously disagree there.

Mr. MOOSE. We are going to disagree with that one altogether.

Mr. CHENEY. Where would you take action, given the specific situations around the world, where we are faced with the immediate problem that has developed over the last 10 years, major Soviet/Cuban military presence.

Mr. MOOSE. I would be in favor of doing almost anything to Mr. Qadhafi, lest the earlier implication be left on the record. I thought about it because I was the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and we dealt with sub-Sahara Africa. I didn't have to deal with the Magreb directly, but I would be all in favor of nuking him, if necessary.

Mr. CHENEY. That may be the low cost option. We come back to——

Mr. MOOSE. Except for the neighbors.

Mr. CHENEY. We come back to Afghanistan, Soviet troops obviously are involved, but it seems there you are advocating a course of action that runs the risk, since there are Soviet military personnel involved, of potential major escalation. There you are more

likely to get into a major superpower confrontation because you already have Soviet military personnel.

Mr. MOOSE. I thought there was a pretty major Soviet commitment there already. It does not seem to help them a lot to make it bigger.

I think maybe they have come to the conclusion they don't need to be bigger, but maybe they need to be smarter.

Mr. CHENEY. The one place I am familiar with where we had a negotiating arrangement, of course, with the opposition was in Vietnam. After a major commitment of resources and then ultimately a negotiated settlement—of course, we all know what happened—the great tragedy.

I am not optimistic that negotiations are going to solve our problems in any of these places.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I simply would like to thank our panelists today. It has been one of the more enjoyable and interesting hearings we have had and while I am not certain we have changed anybody's minds, I would like to thank Mr. Moose, Dr. Bissell, Dr. Rotberg, and Mr. Simes for their appearance.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. Gentlemen, in order to contribute to my education a little bit more, I would like to examine the two views of the world which Mr. Cheney has expressed so well: On one part an inexorable Soviet aggression which never pulls back from any of its victories and a somewhat more flexible interpretation of the world.

It seems to me in the case of the really overwhelming expansion of communism in the post World War II era, which was that of China, we went through all of these same arguments. I remember the debate in 1949 over who lost China to the Soviets and then I remember in 1950 when MacArthur wanted to unleash Chiang Kai-shek from Formosa to help deal the final blow to Chinese communism. And then the Chinese split with the Soviets a few years later and then we were rescued by Richard Nixon and Kissinger who finally decided the Chinese were our kind of Communists and we could deal with them and they turned out to be pragmatic Marxists rather than Soviet controlled Marxists.

If there is any one example of a loss of Soviet influence in the Communist world, I suspect that is it. We have seen that even a minuscule country like Mozambique is more affected by where it sees it can get the most benefit, from the Soviets or from the West in terms of the posture that it takes and if it thinks it can get more benefit from the West it is willing to reject some of the Soviet influence.

We have seen the Egyptians throw out the Soviet advisers when they felt they can get more out of the United States. We misjudge or underrate these Third World countries when we assume that they don't know what is best for themselves and make a judgment as to which way to go in order to get the best advantage.

The situations where we have lost to the Soviets I would characterize, as one in almost every case, in which American stupidity produced a vacuum in which the Soviets could move. Given a reduction of that stupidity these countries begin to make pragmatic adjustments based on their own self-interest.

That is a view that I would like to contrast with this inexorable monolithic expansionist, never-pull-back point of view that Mr. Cheney and Mr. McEwen are presenting.

Is there any validity to this point of view or am I completely off base with this?

Mr. Simes, you are the best theoretician in this area.

Mr. SIMES. I would not want to put words into Mr. Cheney's mouth. Knowing his views and talking to him on many occasions in the past I interpreted him somewhat differently and I thought his perspective was more nuanced than you implied.

I can give you plenty of examples when countries which were occupied by Soviet troops become independent. The Soviets signed the Austrian Peace Treaty in 1955 and they gave back to the Finns part of their territory and, of course, they left Iran in 1946.

So I certainly would never suggest that once the Soviets control some piece of real estate it is forever and they don't control Angola, certainly not yet.

Mr. BROWN. Do they control any state in Africa?

Mr. SIMES. I don't think they control any state in Africa. I don't think we should talk in those very apocalyptic terms.

Mr. BROWN. Would you argue that they have monolithic control over even their Eastern European bloc nations?

Mr. SIMES. I would argue that they dominate Eastern Europe, but there is a growing degree of autonomy. But let me make one simple point.

I am very glad you mentioned both the Egyptians and the Chinese. The Egyptians leaders were never Marxists-Leninists and they were never controlled by the Soviets.

In China, a country of enormous size, they always had an independent Communist Party with great tradition. Mao had difficult relations with Stalin for decades. It is true that the Chinese eventually had a split with the Soviets.

It is also true, however, that during the period of their cooperation they presented the United States with two terrible military confrontations, one in Korea and another in Vietnam.

As far as the Egyptians are concerned, again, it is true that there was eventually the Soviet-Egyptian split, but in the process we got two wars in 1967 and 1973. There was also a split between the Soviet Union—I will add one to your list—between the Soviet Union and Somalia but in the process Mogadishu got enough weapons and military training to attack Ethiopia.

I think when you are dealing with a superpower like the Soviet Union, which is a superpower in only one respect, military respect, there is a temptation to exploit regional instabilities and that is against American interests and that is dangerous.

I would never be so courageous as to tell you that 10 years from now if Mr. Savimbi is defeated MPLA would never expel the Soviets from Angola.

What I do know is we have a specific choice to make and on balance it seems it is a more prudent policy to support UNITA.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Moose.

Mr. MOOSE. If I could just add a comment to that. Egypt, is a special case perhaps. Looking at the Russian record in Africa, they have been expelled from Sudan. They certainly lost influence in

Mali. They have lost influence in Guinea and Ghana. They have lost a great deal of influence in Congo, Brazzaville. The other Portuguese colonies, reference has already been made to Mozambique.

I would never say we should rest because the situation will take care of itself, or that we don't need to worry about the Russians.

I would never stop putting pressure on them in the appropriate forum and in the appropriate ways about this issue. But I think we can count a good deal on Africans looking to their own African interest.

The Russians tried to run a coup against the leadership of the MPLA in Angola in the late seventies. The Russian Ambassador was declared persona non grata as were some other members of his staff.

There are a lot of people in Luanda who remember that and they don't necessarily trust Russians. Their interests could very easily diverge once they are taken cut from under the threat of the South Africans.

They could diverge, and probably will. There is every reason in the world for an oil economy with investment needs and markets needs to get unhitched from the Russian war materials supply as soon as they can.

I suspect that is what is going to happen in the long term.

Mr. BROWN. I am just trying to broaden the frame work and debate here a little bit because I don't accept this position that the Soviets are 10 feet tall and that everybody is going to welcome them with open arms once they gain military control of a country and that there is no possibility that there will be any progress.

The Soviets are not that smart. They don't have that much to offer.

It has been pointed out that most of these countries need a peaceful setting, they need economic assistance, technical assistance and other kinds of things. We can provide them but the Soviets can't and they are going to, therefore, seek some sort of a relationship with us under those circumstances.

Mr. SIMES. Congressman, I just would like to refer you to a major authority on Soviet foreign policy whose name is Ambassador Dobrynin. Mr. Nixon in his memoirs mentioned his conversation with Dobrynin where he complained about the Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia. That was after the United States Congress denied the President the opportunity to bomb Cambodia.

Mr. Dobrynin smiled, according to Nixon and he said, well, why do you complain to me and why do you blame the Vietnamese? If you are really upset you should blame the U.S. Congress.

I very much hope that we will not get a similar comment several years from now from a Soviet Ambassador regarding Angola.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McEwen.

Your time was up quite some time ago.

Mr. BROWN. I am sorry. It is so enjoyable. Time flies when you are having fun.

Mr. MCEWEN. I agree. I appreciate your being here today.

I reread the testimony concerning Africa by the Secretary of State during the Carter administration, Mr. Moose and some others, and found it most enlightening. As I view that period prior to my arrival in the Congress, and as I looked then at Iran and Af-

ghanistan and South Yemen and Ethiopia and Grenada and Nicaragua and all of that I never had a real feel as to exactly why and how those things were being done and what philosophy was behind it.

I have often asked the question in discussions of Middle East policy now as opposed to what it was, and when our ambassador to the United Nations said we think Khomenei might be a saint, and the expressions of support for Ortega when the throngs were in Managua chanting "Zero, Zero, Zero," in favor of Eden Pastora, and the U.S. State Department choosing sides in that civil war—I never quite fully understood it. And I am grateful that, Mr. Moose, you are willing to be here today and to help me get some insight as to the decisionmaking process of that period.

The resolution before us has to do with Mr. Savimbi, and I would like to just quickly lay out to all three of you some questions as to the legitimacy of UNITA's complaints against the Angolan Government, the military preparedness and effectiveness of Savimbi's forces, the support of the tribes in Angola versus support for Savimbi or the Angola Government.

How much true support does he have? What is his record on human rights? Is his effort viable at all or is it just a propaganda campaign on his part?

Mr. Bissell, Dr. Bissell.

Mr. BISSELL. You have put your finger on a number of very important issues on which I think you should have a range of views beyond ours.

I think it goes back to the important question of why, for instance, there are Soviets and Cubans in Angola. They are not there just because of South Africans. They are also there because the MPLA is an exceedingly unstable regime. It has a narrow base. It has had difficulty recruiting Ovimbundu into the leadership of the party; that is the ethnic group that supports UNITA.

It has had extreme difficulty enlisting Bakongo in the leadership of the MPLA. And this in itself is adequate reason for the MPLA suffering from instability in the indefinite future. That is, I know, a major reason why people have talked about the best case being one that would produce a national government and encompass other groups, because the MPLA has proven over 10 years of being incapable of doing so.

Mr. MCEWEN. Does Savimbi have the capacity?

Mr. BISSELL. That is a good question. We don't know. We know the MPLA's track record. We don't know Savimbi's track record simply because he has been consistently in opposition.

But it is a crucial question and one that would have to be addressed. I think it has come up, in fact, in discussions that the United States has with the MPLA over Namibia that in fact the MPLA argues only two-thirds of the Cubans are there to deal with South Africa and the Namibia problem, and they in fact need to retain one-third in order to deal with their own internal stability after a Namibian settlement.

So there is a severe problem there in terms of the unpopularity, and in addition, on the economic front, the inability of the MPLA to deliver to its own people. So there is a long-term issue.

Mr. MCEWEN. Mr. Moose.

Mr. MOOSE. I first met Mr. Savimbi in August 1975. I flew to his then base camp in southern Angola. I have followed his activities very closely since, and have tried to inform myself about him.

He is an intelligent, sincere, charming man. There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever he is ambitious, he is an opportunist. That could describe many of us, I suppose.

He does have a track record. We do have a reasonable record of this. He has switched sides. He has switched sponsors. He has appealed to whoever it is that is going to provide him assistance, depending on which way the wind is blowing.

It is a little bit laughable to quote at great length from Sam Nujoma in Moscow. He is after all singing for his supper, much the way Jonas Savimbi was when he was here in Washington.

I think we can take things with a grain of salt. Savimbi is an authoritarian figure. He is engaged in terrorism, specifically kidnapings. He has a number of foreign prisoners right now he is marching across Angola. It isn't the first time he has done it. He is, nevertheless, an authentic leader of his people, and will have to be reckoned with.

I said this when I was in the State Department. I stand by other Angolans who don't like it. He is an authentic leader of that region. I don't think he will have very much appeal in other parts of the country.

The MPLA at the time of independence was the most broadly based of all of the parties. With events since then, the Bakongo have gone one way and the Ovimbundu have gone the other. But the MPLA could be a national party.

Mr. MCEWEN. What is the comparison between the support from the MPLA when they took control and the support of Savimbi now in terms of number of tribes, people, land area?

Mr. MOOSE. I am not qualified to quantify it as closely as perhaps that you would like. But it is interesting to go back to the time of the ALVOR agreement, for example, that is, January 1975 and look at each of the groups. Holden Roberto, for example, is said to have worked for the CIA since 1962. We almost did the right thing in Angola back in the 1960's. We almost got on the right side, but didn't quite stay the course.

In 1975 Holden Roberto was in the north, and his forces were more numerous than those of the MPLA. MPLA around Luanda had not so much of a tribal base, but because they were better educated, they had employed slightly better kinds of positions. Mulatto influence was heavier around Luanda. Then there was Savimbi down in the south. The MPLA had a great advantage because it had the capital, but its forces were much smaller than the others.

It is very hard to try to quantify the popular support. I don't think any of it means a great deal, really. I think you have to be very cautious about how much importance you attach to it.

Mr. MCEWEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further questions?

Mr. Stump.

Mr. Stokes.

I don't think we could have had a better panel. You all did an excellent job. We appreciate it very, very much. It has been a pleasure to have you with us.

The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[The following was received for the record:]

99TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 4276

To require that any United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola be openly acknowledged and publicly debated.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 27, 1986

Mr. HAMILTON (for himself, Mr. STOKES, Mr. BRILLENSON, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Mr. ROE, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. MCHUGH, and Mr. DWYER of New Jersey) introduced the following bill; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

---

A BILL

To require that any United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola be openly acknowledged and publicly debated.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DECLARATION THAT ANY SUPPORT FOR MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA SHOULD BE OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED AND PUBLICLY DEBATED.

The Congress finds that the United States Government should support military or paramilitary operations in Angola

only if the provision of that support is the openly acknowledged policy of the United States. It is, therefore, the sense of the Congress that the United States Government should not provide any such support until the President has publicly informed the Congress and the American people that United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola is important to the national security and the Congress has approved such support.

SEC. 2. ENSURING THAT SUPPORT IS OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED.

(a) ANY SUPPORT MUST BE OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED.—During fiscal years 1986 and 1987, a department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States Government may obligate or expend funds—

(1) to conduct, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Angola, or

(2) to provide any financial, material, or other assistance, directly or indirectly, to any group engaged in military or paramilitary operations in Angola,

only if the use of funds for that purpose is the openly acknowledged policy of the United States Government, as determined in accordance with subsection (b).

(b) PRESIDENTIAL REQUEST AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.—In order to ensure that any United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in

Angola is openly acknowledged, funds may be used for the purposes described in subsection (a) only if—

(1) the President determines that United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola is important to the national security and submits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate a request that the Congress approve openly acknowledged United States Government support for those operations; and

(2) the Congress enacts a joint resolution approving United States Government support for military or paramilitary operations in Angola.

Any such support may be provided only to the extent permitted by that joint resolution.

(c) INTERPRETATION OF LIMITATION.—Nothing in this section should be construed to prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for—

(1) United States diplomatic activities;

(2) activities of the United States Armed Forces which are reported to the Congress pursuant to section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution; or

(3) assistance provided through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or the International Committee of the Red Cross.

(d) RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER LAWS.—The requirements of this section may not be waived under the authority of any other provision of law. This section supercedes any provision of law which might otherwise be construed to allow funds to be used for the purposes described in subsection (a).

○